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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Tax Preparer Decision Making: An Examination of 
Controls, Motivations, and Decision Outcomes 
Beth Y. Vermeer 
 
 
 
 
To complete the requirements of my doctoral degree, I selected the option of 
writing a three paper essay series in lieu of a traditional dissertation.  The 
abstracts for each essay are presented in succession.  
Essay One: “Behavioral Tax Research: A Review and Prospective” 
 My first essay is the literature review portion of my essay series, which 
motivated my second and third essays in the series.  In this essay, I explore earlier 
reviews in behavioral, experimental tax research and continue forward to trace the 
evolution of ideas in the primary streams of research in this area.   
Essay Two: “IRS Oversight, Client Risk, and Tax Professionals: Does 
Increased Control Deter Aggressive Decision Making?” 
 My second essay examines the impact of the new Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) preparer oversight program on the decision making of tax 
professionals. Drawing on the tenets of deterrence and control theories, I examine 
decision making under low and high regulatory scrutiny. In summary, I find 
 x 
evidence, consistent with extant literature on control theory, that tax professionals 
increase the aggressiveness of their recommendations and report higher advocacy 
intentions when facing high IRS oversight.  
Essay Three: “Tax Professionals and Antecedents to Aggressive Decision 
Making: An Examination of Client Identification and Economic Importance” 
 Motivated by the results of my second essay, my third essay examines 
why tax professionals may be willing to risk exposure to the increased costs of 
making aggressive recommendations for their clients.  Thus, this essay examines 
the impact of two antecedents to aggressive decision-making, namely the role of 
the interpersonal relationship with the client (client identification) and the 
economic importance of the client, on the recommendations of tax professionals.  
Consistent with the tenets of Social Identity Theory, I find that stronger client 
identification leads to more aggressive recommendations and suggest that client 
identification is an important construct for future research in this area.  Further, I 
find that a client’s economic importance does not follow the presumed linear 
positive relationship with more aggressive recommendations.  Rather the results 
suggest a nonlinear relationship between economic importance and aggressive 
recommendations, demonstrating a complex and multi-faceted response to 
economic importance. 
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CHAPTER 1: ESSAY ONE 
Behavioral Tax Research: A Review and Prospective 
 
 
1.1 Abstract 
Taxes are an important accounting phenomenon and accounting research has 
evolved to foster a niche in tax research that rivals other areas of interest, such as audit 
and managerial issues.  In the following review, I recognize earlier reviews in behavioral, 
experimental tax research and continue forward to trace the evolution of ideas in the 
primary streams of research in this area.  In addition, I work toward building a 
framework, highlight important relationships in the research, provide a synopsis of the 
major findings in each study, and identify how these ideas may relate to future scholarly 
research in the behavioral, experimental tax area.   
Specifically, in order to develop a consistent theoretical web for both taxpayer 
and tax professional decision-making, I believe it is imperative that our focus on theory 
development shift to recognizing practical and fundamental tax and accounting concepts.  
To this end, future research could exploit the underpinnings of the tax environment and 
examine taxpayer and tax professional behavior in relation to recent tax court cases and 
administrative rulings, tax law changes, and new IRS initiatives.  In addition, future 
research could examine the iterative interactions of taxpayers and tax professionals, 
potentially drawing on negotiation literature as a beginning step in this process.  
Although there are significant areas of improvement necessary in the theoretical 
framework of experimental, behavioral tax research, these shortcomings may offer 
significant opportunities for future research in the area. 
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1.2 Introduction    
Taxes are an important accounting phenomenon and accounting research has 
evolved to foster a niche in tax research that rivals other areas of interest, such as audit 
and managerial issues.  Tax research has also matured to allow for the study of the 
reciprocal interplay between accounting and tax issues, enabling us to examine 
phenomena inextricably linked in practice.   
Largely, tax research has scattered into empirical and behavioral camps, each with 
a distinctly different focus.  While archival, microeconomic-based, empirical research 
rigorously tests past transactions and provides direct contributions to how taxes affect 
other financial and business decisions (tradeoffs), the interaction of taxes and asset prices, 
multi-national and multistate tax research, and other issues (Shackelford and Shevlin 
2001); behavioral, experimental research examines taxpayers, their choices, decisions and 
attitudes, as well as the biases, elements of judgment, and potential advocacy role of tax 
professionals in each decision context.  These two forms of research are inherently 
divergent, but collectively complementary, since together they develop a more complete 
picture of the stakeholders, motivations, transactions, and decision contexts that form the 
basis of tax transactions.  For instance, according to Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), the 
finding in many recent dividend tax and capital gains tax capitalization studies in the 
archival area produce surprising results that have the potential to overturn longstanding 
empirical positions, such as shareholder tax irrelevance (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001).  
This may be an area where a well-designed experiment could lend additional support to 
  3 
understand the mindset of investors and identify what intrinsic tax factors may contribute 
to capital pricing decisions. 
Behavioral tax research also serves to quantify, explain, and predict the decisions, 
motivations, and actions of stakeholders, such as taxpayers and tax professionals, in the 
tax planning, compliance, and decision processes.  Experimental, behavioral tax research 
affords researchers the unique opportunity to engage with these stakeholders, in defined 
contexts, and gain insight into their decision matrices and personal and professional 
motivations, imparting a further understanding of the factors that are important in various 
tax settings.  
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) review empirical tax research and 
comprehensively detail three areas of research in the archival, microeconomic-based 
stream of research: how taxes affect other financial and business decisions (tradeoffs), the 
interaction of taxes and asset prices, and multi-national and multistate tax research.  As a 
result, I will not discuss the archival tax literature.  Thus, my aim is to survey and provide 
a comprehensive review of behavioral, experimental tax research; examine the 
contributions of prior research in this area; and identify areas that may be fruitful for 
future scholars of behavioral, experimental tax research.   
 Much of the prior research in the behavioral tax arena was aimed at identifying 
attributing factors that impact taxpayer compliance and evasion.  In addition, prior 
research has examined the professional judgment and decision-making processes of tax 
professionals and, more limited, the ensuing relationship between taxpayer and tax 
professional.  A study of the existing literature leads to primal classification into two 
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broad categories: taxpayer behaviors and the role of the tax professional.  Once these 
broad categories are established, we can parse out subcategories and arrive at the 
following current streams of research within taxpayer behaviors and the role of the tax 
professional.  The taxpayer behaviors category is divided between taxpayer compliance 
factors and taxpayer evasion factors and then further parsed into subcategories as 
indicated: (a) Taxpayer Compliance Factors: (i) framing, (ii) income source, and (iii) 
taxpayer uncertainty and (b) Tax Evasion Factors and Correlates of Ethical, Moral, and 
Social Attitudes: (i) ethics (moral obligation), (ii) tax complexity and fairness, (iii) 
framing (context), (iv) social stigmatization, and (v) audit/litigation success predictions.  
The role of the tax professional is further parsed into the following subcategories: (i) 
individual psychological factors, (ii) economic risk and reward factors, (iii) task input 
factors, (iv) cognitive processing factors, and (v) task output factors.1   
Four previous survey studies have reviewed behavioral, experimental tax research 
in the areas of (i) taxpayer compliance research (Jackson and Milliron 1986) and (Cuccia 
1994), (ii) tax evasion research (Weigel, Hessing and Elffers 1987), and (iii) tax 
professionals’ judgment and decision-making (Roberts 1998).  Jackson and Milliron 
(1986) surveyed existing tax compliance literature prior to the mid-1980’s, recognized 14 
variables linked in prior research to taxpayer noncompliance, reviewed methodologies 
utilized in early tax compliance research, and suggested theoretical areas potentially 
fruitful for conducting future research.   Cuccia (1994) continued the discussion of the                                                         1 See Figure 1 for a diagram of these categories.  
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development of tax compliance research, summarized additional research findings, 
theoretically identified how future research should proceed, and advocated for a change 
in how we define the decision making context.  Weigel, Hessing, and Elffers (1987) 
reviewed early tax evasion and noncompliance research, distinguished between identified 
variables that instigate taxpayer behaviors and those that act as constraints on taxpayer 
behaviors, and suggested a social psychological model of tax evasion behavior that the 
authors believe may contribute to future literature in this area.  Finally, Roberts (1998) 
comprehensively reviewed 52 earlier judgment and decision-making research studies, 
examined 50 factors affecting tax accountants’ decision-making processes, and grouped 
these factors into five related categories.  In the following sections, I will discuss these 
early reviews in greater detail and continue forward to trace the evolution of ideas in the 
primary streams of behavioral, experimental research.  In addition, I will work toward 
building a framework, highlighting important relationships in the research, providing a 
synopsis of the major findings in each study, and identifying how these ideas may relate 
to future scholarly research in the behavioral, experimental tax area.   
Since this review recognizes only behavioral, experimental tax research, I have 
chosen to categorize reviewed studies based on the primary factors manipulated in each 
study.  I have also highlighted the recognized theories, where appropriate.  However, I do 
not independently discuss methodology in this review because the methodologies, 
overall, are discussed in prior reviews of the literature (see Jackson and Milliron (1986); 
Weigel, Hessing, and Elffers (1987); Cuccia (1994); and Roberts (1998)) and are 
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relatively uniform due to the consistent scope of behavioral, experimental tax research 
that I have reviewed.  
Section 2 discusses research on taxpayer behaviors, further refined into categories 
of compliance and evasion, as indicated.  Section 3 summarizes research in the taxpayer 
behaviors category and highlights prospective thoughts on how future research can enrich 
studies in this area.  Section 4 shifts the focus to detail the role of the tax professional, 
with further delineation into five categories of factors motivating tax professional 
judgment and decision-making consistent with Roberts (1998), as indicated.  Section 5 
summarizes research focusing on tax professionals and provides ideas for future research 
in this area.  Section 6 concludes with an overall synthesis of the literature and 
prospective thoughts on future research opportunities in the behavioral, experimental tax 
arena.  
1.3 Taxpayer Behaviors 
 
Taxpayer Compliance 
Individual taxpayer compliance is a voluntary exercise and the revenues from 
individual income taxes account for about 45% of total annual tax revenues in the United 
States.  In 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported that the difference between 
what taxpayers should have paid and what they actually paid on a timely basis (the tax 
gap) totals to $345 billion.  The IRS also concluded that the individual income tax is the 
single largest source of the annual tax gap, accounting for close to two-thirds of the total 
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tax gap.  (IRS 2006)  As a result, individual income tax compliance is an important issue 
that behavioral tax research should and has investigated.   
The early work in behavioral tax research examined the attributes of taxpayers in 
tax compliance situations.  Jackson and Milliron (1986) surveyed existing tax compliance 
literature prior to the mid-1980’s and provided a host of variables linked in prior research 
to taxpayer noncompliance.  In addition, Jackson and Milliron (1986) reviewed the 
methodologies utilized in early tax compliance research and suggested theoretical areas 
for establishing a basis for conducting future research.  The authors then proceeded with 
a call for refining methodological approaches to research, such as using more 
sophisticated statistical designs and techniques in survey research, increasing realism in 
experimental research, and relating research to theory.  They suggested that deterrence 
theory and prospect theory may prove most fruitful in tax compliance research.  Research 
articles such as those by White, Harrison, and Harrell (1993), Christensen and Hite 
(1997), Vines and Wartick (2003), and others answer this call with research including 
elements of prospect theory and framing effects as well as elements of deterrence theory.   
Jackson and Milliron (1986) also discuss agency theory as a potential way to study the 
relationship between taxpayer and tax preparer and as a way to explain or highlight a tax 
preparer’s motivations.  A wealth of research has examined the role and decisions of tax 
preparers, which I will discuss in a subsequent section. 
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The most important contribution of this early review was the recognition and 
summarization of 14 variables linked to taxpayer compliance.2  The authors highlighted 
the occurrence of these 14 variables in 43 early taxpayer compliance studies across four 
dimensions: survey studies, experimental studies, analytical studies, and regression 
modeling.  The 14 variables consist of: age, sex, education, income level, income source, 
occupation, peer influence, ethics, fairness, complexity, IRS contact, probability of 
detection, sanctions, and tax rates.  Some of these variables have persisted and are 
examined in current compliance related research.  In particular, studies examining 
income source, ethics, fairness, complexity, tax rates, and IRS contact will be specifically 
reviewed in conjunction with other research studies.    
In the following section, I will use Jackson and Milliron’s (1986) identification of 
income source as a variable category, which has received attention from subsequent 
research.  I have also identified and prescribed two additional variables, framing and 
taxpayer uncertainty, which I will use to highlight subsequent research in these areas.  Of 
the remaining variables identified by Jackson and Milliron (1986), I will discuss ethics 
(moral obligation), tax complexity and fairness (tax law equity), compliant peers (social 
stigmatization), probability of detection (audit/litigation success predictions), and several 
other variables that are examined secondarily as part of the manipulations of subsequent 
tax evasion research. 
 
                                                         2 The authors specifically reference 14 variables in their main tables.  They also note several other variables that were examined not included in the tables. 
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Framing  
The framing of a transaction as a win/lose scenario or as a tax due/tax refund may 
imply different contextual connotations to taxpayers.  The basic premise of these studies 
is that certain contextual factors, such as receiving a refund, will promote greater 
taxpayer compliance.  Several studies have examined the impact of framing effects on 
how taxpayers process tax information and make tax decisions. 
White et al (1993) build upon two prior research studies, marrying prospect 
theory and deterrence theory, by examining the framing of an individual’s income tax 
withholding position (tax refund versus additional tax due) when filing their annual tax 
return posited against low, medium, and high detection rates and penalties.  White et al 
(1993) find that experimental subjects in a tax due position are more likely to engage in 
noncompliant behaviors than those in a tax refund position.  When examined against a 
three-way interaction among withholding position (tax due or refund), detection rate (at 
three levels), and penalty amount (at three levels), the framing effects were significant in 
all but the very lowest detection and penalty rates.  The study also found that adult 
taxpayers engaged in more noncompliant behavior than undergraduate students. 
In contrast to White et al (1993), Christensen and Hite (1997) examine whether 
taxpayers’ risk perceptions and subsequent reporting decisions are influenced by the type 
of reporting decision (income or deduction), framing effects (win or lose), and level of 
uncertainty.  The authors found that taxpayers’ decisions are influenced by the presence 
of ambiguity and the level of uncertainty, but found no evidence of a correlation with 
framing effects.  
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Vines and Wartick (2003) experimentally examine the implications of offering a 
direct subsidy versus a tax deduction to a disadvantaged taxpayer.  Both direct subsidies 
and deductions can be used to promote social and economic objectives; however, the 
form (framing) of the payment may have implications for how the payment is perceived 
and, subsequently, the individual’s reporting of income on a tax return.  The authors 
found that, despite the equivalence of the two subsidies, participants disadvantaged by 
not receiving a tax deduction reported less income than participants disadvantaged by not 
receiving a direct subsidy.   
 
Income Source 
   Drawing from one of the variables identified in Jackson and Milliron (1986), we 
now turn our attention to the effect of income source on taxpayer compliance behaviors.  
Income source studies, in particular the effects of earned versus endowed income, have 
produced surprising results in how taxpayer behaviors may be influenced by the form of 
the income and the effort required to derive the income. 
Boylan and Sprinkle (2001) attempt to reconcile discrepancies between 
experimental taxpayer compliance studies and archival-empirical studies by examining 
the impact of endowed versus earned income on the relationship between tax rates and 
compliance decisions.  Most experimental compliance research endows participants with 
income, resulting in a decrease in tax compliance, whereas, archival-empirical studies use 
data that typically includes earned income.  Specifically, the authors find results 
consistent with archival-empirical studies and economic theory when manipulating the 
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effect of a tax rate increase (20% to 40%) on a taxpayer’s decision to report more (less) 
taxable income when income is earned (endowed).  This highlights the fact that taxpayers 
may respond differently to the amount of time and effort required to earn income in 
making compliance related decisions.     
  Boylan (2010) followed the line of research investigating differences between 
earned and endowed income with an examination on taxpayer compliance subsequent to 
a prior audit.  Boylan (2010) finds that taxpayer compliance increases following a prior 
audit in situations involving endowed income, but taxpayer compliance decreases 
following a prior audit in situations involving earned income.  These results induce the 
conclusion that the impact of a prior audit on a taxpayer’s subsequent compliance 
decisions is affected by the time and effort required to generate the income.  This study 
may also help posit another explanatory variable, source of income, useful for examining 
the effects of prior audits on taxpayer decisions. 
 
Taxpayer Uncertainty    While taxpayer uncertainty has received some attention in prior research, the 
following studies attempt to study changes in uncertainty when interacted with other 
economic factors, such as tax rate, penalty rate, and audit probability and how this 
uncertainty may impact taxpayer decisions to report taxable income. 
Klepper (1988), Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992), Milliron (1985), and others 
began examining taxpayer uncertainty and tax complexity in relation to tax reporting 
decisions.  Beck, David, and Jung (1991) continued to develop this research in the 
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experimental economic area utilizing and fine tuning a tax reporting model, which 
examines changes in uncertainty and other economic factors, such as tax rate, penalty 
rate, and audit probability, on reported taxable income.  In the 1991 study, the authors 
found that when penalty rates and audit probabilities increased, risk-neutral subjects were 
found to report higher levels of income.  The results also suggested that a reduction in 
uncertainty led to higher (lower) levels of reported taxable income when penalty rates or 
audit probabilities were decreased (increased). 
Beck, Davis, and Jung (1992) continued this research stream by examining 
nonstrategic and strategic audit regimes and found that tax rate changes have significant 
effects on tax reporting decisions under both audit regimes.  However, an increase in 
taxable income uncertainty contributed to a decrease in subjects’ reporting low income 
under strategic audit scenarios, but had no effect on income reporting in a nonstrategic 
audit regime.  Overall, subjects reported low income more frequently than was predicted 
using either model. 
 Beck, Davis, and Jung (1996) extended the study of Beck et al. (1992) using a 
game-theory model and found that taxpayer uncertainty and prescribed audit policies 
increased risk and, thereby, increased the prevalence of the decision to purchase 
professional tax advice.   The taxpayers in the experiment also tended to purchase tax 
advice more frequently than predicted in the model, even though taxpayers then tended to 
ignore the purchased advice when making reporting decisions.  Finally, the authors 
conclude that the availability of tax advice does not have an effect on post-audit tax 
revenues. 
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 The study by Beck et al. (1996) begins to examine the interaction effects of a tax 
professional on the taxpayers’ decision-making process, which I believe is imperative in 
the examination of taxpayer compliance, avoidance, and evasion decision contexts.  The 
authors contribute an interesting idea to the literature; however, the requisite assumptions 
of the models employed may introduce severe limitations to the realism and 
generalizability of the results.  Furthermore, I suggest that the interactions between 
taxpayer and tax professional may implicitly be an iterative give and take process not 
tested in these experiments.  
 
Summary and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
As noted above, research subsequent to the review by Jackson and Milliron 
(1986) has continued to examine piecemeal factors of taxpayer compliance.3  I have 
highlighted studies involving the examination of framing effects, income source, and 
taxpayer uncertainty and their subsequent impact on taxpayer compliance decisions.  
Although many of the aforementioned studies motivated their particular manipulations 
within the theory suggested by Jackson and Milliron (1986), the authors found dissimilar 
results in some cases and, ultimately, do not move us any further toward a comprehensive 
framework of taxpayer compliance behavior called for in the early review by Jackson and 
Milliron (1986).  Specifically, while subsequent studies have used theories to motivate 
specific variables, they have not worked toward developing a theory that provides a 
comprehensive understanding of taxpayer behavior.                                                          3 See Table 1 for a summary of behavioral tax compliance research. 
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This lack of a unifying theory is again highlighted in Cuccia’s 1994 literature 
review.  Cuccia (1994) discusses the development of tax compliance research, 
summarizes previous research findings, theoretically identifies how future research 
should proceed, and advocates for a change in how we define the decision making 
context.  Cuccia (1994) suggests that economic models of taxpayer compliance may not 
be constructed to serve as good predictors of behavior since there are a myriad of 
differences in taxpayer attitudes and biases.  However, the author believes that economic 
incentives are important for understanding taxpayer behavior and perhaps we should 
integrate economic and noneconomic factors.  Cuccia (1994) posits that a better 
approach, which examines small groups of taxpayers with homogenous incentives, both 
economic and attitudinal, may propel us toward a better understanding of tax compliance.  
Cuccia (1994) cautions, however, that the two areas in which economic-based research 
may prove most beneficial is in examining professional preparers and corporate 
compliance and not necessarily individual compliance.  
 While the primary streams of behavioral tax research have seemingly 
shifted away from individual taxpayer compliance, this area will continue to gain 
attention due to the pervasiveness of compliance related issues.  With increased 
initiatives on the part of the IRS to close the Tax Gap (U.S. Treasury 2009) and increase 
taxpayer compliance, there has never been a better time to provide an enhanced 
understanding of the taxpayer compliance environment.  As a whole, behavioral, 
experimental tax research has not presented a cohesive model or found an encompassing 
underlying theory of individual tax compliance behavior.  I do not believe it would be fair 
  15 
to define this as a failure, but rather an admittance that tax compliance behaviors are as 
varied and somewhat unpredictable as each of the individuals that comprise the taxpayer 
community.  It is difficult to define all the overlapping factors, motivations, and 
underlying assumptions that go into a tax compliance decision and; therefore, tax 
research will continue to persist in discovering and refining the best predictors of tax 
compliance behavior that can be found at any particular time for that particular subset of 
individuals.   
While manipulations of individual taxpayer behavior may uncover a novel 
variable or construct, I believe that a conclusive model of taxpayer behavior which 
explains taxpayer compliance as a homogenous phenomena may not be a viable 
possibility, given the current lack of definition and continuity in the theoretical 
framework currently in place.    I do believe a model grounded in practical theory might 
help us illuminate taxpayer behaviors in response to actual, practice based tax decisions 
and may move us toward a more cohesive model of taxpayer behavior.  Also, theories, 
like the Theory of Planned Behavior, can support our experimental manipulations and 
provide proverbial coat hangers upon which we can hang our interrelated web of findings 
supported by each respective theory of taxpayer behavior.  However, our focus on theory 
development should shift to recognizing practical and fundamental tax and accounting 
concepts.  We should seek to adopt a more practice driven vantage point, similar to that 
found in capital markets research, financial accounting research, and auditing research.  
From a practical vantage point, we could exploit the practical underpinnings of the tax 
environment and examine taxpayer behaviors in relation to new tax laws, new IRS 
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initiatives, and in response to changes in the accounting and tax environment.  For 
instance, in the last few months, over 10,000 tax professionals received letters from the 
IRS, notifying them that the IRS would potentially be visiting their offices to “heighten 
awareness of preparer responsibilities and increased IRS oversight of tax return 
preparers”. (IRS 2010a) The preparers selected to receive the letters come from a pool of 
preparers who historically submit a large number of returns with Schedules A, C or E, 
regardless of professional designation.  How do we begin to examine the impact of this 
increased oversight?  How does it impact and motivate taxpayers who have substantial 
Schedule A, C, or E income?  How can we ground these questions and motivate them 
with theoretical underpinnings stemming from legal tax rulings and findings from IRS 
inquiries?   
By shifting our focus to developing a practically motivated theory and model of 
taxpayer compliance, we might find the theoretical cohesion we are seeking to define and 
assemble the collective body of work in behavioral, experimental tax research.  Further, 
our findings would evolve to enhance our collective understanding of the tax compliance 
environment and allow us to contribute to the practical and legal implications facing 
taxpayers, tax practice, and regulatory bodies.    
 
Tax Evasion and Correlates of Ethical, Moral, and Social Attitudes  
While tax compliance seems straight forward, the lack of compliance 
(noncompliance) could be a result of perceived or defined tax avoidance or tax evasion.  
As such, these terms represent dissimilar constructs in practical definitional terms.  
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However, prior studies surveyed in tax research have intertwined the terms so much that 
the lines of delineation between one concept and another are cumulatively blurred.  As 
such, I will continue my discussion with an eye toward tax evasion, understanding that 
many of the reviewed compliance studies actually may be examining tax evasion 
behaviors in the operationalization of their compliance manipulations.  For example, 
Boylan (2010) finds that taxpayer compliance increases following a prior audit in 
situations involving endowed income, but taxpayer compliance decreases following a 
prior audit in situations involving earned income.  This may be an overall test of tax 
evasion and how the income is ultimately reported to the taxpayer and the IRS or the 
specific source of the income that demonstrated higher compliance results in this study is 
perceived as targeted by IRS initiatives, as experience with a prior audit would now 
reveal.  Since the lack of definitional categorization cannot be fixed at this time, the 
remainder of this section will be buffered with a specific emphasis toward examining the 
ethical, moral, and social attitudes present in tax evasion decisions. 
Weigel, Hessing, and Elffers (1987) review early tax evasion and noncompliance 
research, distinguish between identified variables that instigate taxpayer behaviors and 
those that act as constraints on taxpayer behaviors, and suggest a social psychological 
model of tax evasion behavior that the authors believe may contribute to future literature 
in this area.  The authors identify financial strain (amount of taxes due after withholding) 
and personality (orientation, dissatisfaction, equity, fairness, and direct experience with 
enforcement authorities) as variables supporting tax evasion behaviors and opportunity 
(occupation and income source), threats of punishment (probability of detection and 
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sanctions), social disapproval, and personal controls (moral and civic beliefs, ethics, and 
attitudes about evasion) as constraints motivating individuals away from evasion 
behaviors.   
While Weigel et al. (1987) review the specific construct of tax evasion, their 
evasion variables significantly overlap those of Jackson and Milliron (1986).  See Table 2 
for a correlation of the compliance variables identified in the Jackson and Milliron (1986) 
review and the Weigel et al. (1987) review. 
In deference to continuity and due to the high correlation between the compliance 
and evasion variables, I use the variables identified by Jackson and Milliron (1986) to 
categorize tax evasion studies, in the following section, with the following variable 
definitions4: ethics (moral obligation), tax complexity and fairness (tax law equity), and 
compliant peers (social stigmatization).   I have also identified and prescribed two 
additional variables, framing and audit/litigation success predictions, which I will also 
use to highlight subsequent research in the area of tax evasion.  Many of the tax evasion 
studies also manipulate several other variables introduced by Jackson and Milliron (1986) 
that are examined secondarily as part of the manipulations of subsequent tax evasion 
research.                                                              4 Jackson and Milliron (1986) identified 14 variables.  I use the stated variable in my categorizations and place the equivalent term used in current research in parentheses next to each of Jackson and Milliron’s (1986) defined variables. 
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Ethics (Moral Obligation)    Ethics and moral obligation are important constructs for examining the evasion 
decisions of taxpayers.  This area of research is particularly rich in psychological 
theories, such as deterrence theory, the theory of reasoned action, and the Theory of 
Planned Behavior, which examines attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral 
control. 
Reckers, Sanders, and Roark (1994) interject on the findings of White et al (1993) 
and other related studies that examine withholding effects (refund or tax due positions) 
and tax rate effects in taxpayer evasion decisions. Reckers et al (1994) find that tax ethics 
may be highly significant in tax evasion decisions and posit that tax ethics (morals) may 
be a missing variable in tax modeling scenarios.   
With the precept that moral obligation may proceed as a moderating influence in 
tax compliance decisions (Reckers et al. 1994), Bobek and Hatfield (2003) incorporate 
the Theory of Planned Behavior and use it as a theoretical framework for examining 
taxpayer compliance intentions.  Based on Reckers et al. (1994), they add moral 
obligation to the theory’s specific constructs of attitude, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control.  The authors find that the role of moral obligation is influential, but 
much more complex than Reckers et al. (1994) suggested.  In particular, high levels of 
moral obligation alone do not eliminate cheating, but high levels of moral obligation 
interacting with other factors in the decision scenario may contribute to higher tax 
compliance. 
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Ghosh and Crain (1995) find that individuals with lower ethical standards will 
display more intentional noncompliance.  However, a person’s attitude toward risk may 
overcome the influence of ethics in more uncertain audit environments.  Ghosh and Crain 
(1995) examine moral obligation and the resulting effects when ethics are interacted with 
variables of risk and uncertainty. 
Hanno and Violette (1996) examine beliefs and norms underlying taxpayer 
compliance decisions using the theory of reasoned action, a social psychological model.  
Using the model, the authors find that both self-reported and hypothetical compliance 
behaviors were related to a taxpayers’ intention to comply.  The authors found specific 
differences in compliance intentions and behaviors when traced to differences in beliefs 
about the following interacting variables: moral and civic obligations, concerns about 
monetary outcomes of compliance decisions, and social pressures of an IRS audit.   
Kaplan, Newberry, and Reckers (1997) extend prior research on moral reasoning 
by examining the effect of moral reasoning and educational communications on tax 
evasion intensions.   Specifically, the authors conducted an experiment in which they 
gave subjects a Defining Issues Test, which measures the level of moral reasoning in a 
person’s decision-making skills.  Then, the authors proceeded to gather information about 
each subjects’ reporting decisions in decisions where the opportunity to evade was high.  
The authors concluded that tax evasion intensions were significantly lower for taxpayers 
who demonstrated high moral reasoning.    
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Tax Complexity and Fairness (Tax Complexity and Tax Law Equity) 
   In prior research, tax fairness has involved at least two dimensions: overall 
perceived benefits derived for tax paid and the equity of a taxpayer’s burden in relation to 
other taxpayers.  Tax complexity research studies the perceived complexity of the tax 
system.  Prior research on tax complexity has found mixed results and, it appears, that the 
impact of tax complexity may be highly correlated with other compliance factors, such as 
fairness and opportunity for evasion.  Tax fairness research has also found similar results, 
with a highly correlated linked to tax complexity.  This is perhaps the motivation for the 
following study, which examines ways to moderate and understand the perceptions of 
complexity and overall fairness of the tax laws. 
Carnes and Cuccia (1996) examine the effects of taxpayer perceptions of tax law 
equity and complexity on taxpayer compliance.  The authors find that taxpayers have 
consistent beliefs about the necessity of tax complexity and these beliefs are found to 
moderate the predicted belief that tax complexity generates a negative perception of 
equity.  The authors conclude that taxpayers need to understand the justifications for tax 
complexity and taxing authorities should consider simplifying areas of the tax law that 
are perceived as least justified and/or educate taxpayers as to the purposes for 
complexity. 
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Framing (Context)    
Framing was introduced as a new variable under taxpayer behaviors, suggesting 
that the context of the decision may be as important as the actual compliance/evasion 
decision at hand.  The following study specifically examines how the absence of the tax 
context may have severe consequences to the external validity of the results.   
Wartick, Madeo, and Vines (1999) highlight the issue of context in tax 
experiments.  Specifically, they explain that the experimental economics method, 
increasingly employed to study the impact of tax policy on taxpayer behavior, attempts to 
create a microeconomy in the laboratory with strict controls that effectively eliminate any 
connotations to real-world phenomena.  This association to the real-world could cause 
decisions based on external values rather the rewards and penalties established in the 
microeconomy.  The authors find that introduction of the tax context subsequently caused 
subjects to report more income than when nontax context was introduced.  Age also 
played an important factor in how much income was reported in each decision context.  
These findings cause questions about experimental economics methods that did not 
strictly control the impact of context in the experiment.  Again, this study raises the issue 
of whether we can effectively remove tax context in taxpayer compliance and evasion 
decisions and retain external validity in our research. 
 
Compliant Peers (Social Stigmatization) 
 
Research in this area has examined the effects of a taxpayers’ associates, 
including friends, relatives, co-workers, and other peer groups.  Utilizing deterrence 
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theory, reference theory, and the correlation with the probability of detection, prior 
research has found a significant positively correlated link between the influence of peer 
groups and tax evasion. 
Porcano and Price (1993) continue this line of research with an examination of the 
effects of social stigmatization on tax evasion decisions.  The authors study several 
variables employed to determine their influence on the stigmatization effect.  The authors 
find that social stigmatization, overall, was an effective penalty that significantly affected 
tax evasion, especially when larger amounts of cash were involved, audit probability was 
higher, and the number of noncompliant peers was lower. 
 
Audit/Litigation Success Predictions  
Predictions of audit/litigation success are closely tied to the probability of 
detection, which has been examined in prior literature.  Prior findings have found mixed 
results in their examination of detection probability as a factor in tax evasion decisions.  
This is an interesting area that should receive additional consideration, especially given 
the IRS growing concern over the Tax Gap and recent efforts to bring more taxpayers to 
compliance.  The following study illustrates how the prediction of audit and subsequent 
litigation success may contribute to the propensity to evade taxes, an unintentional 
consequence of taxpayer protection efforts surrounding the burden of proof rules. 
Magro and Stetson (2004) examine the impact of the burden of proof rules under 
Internal Revenue Code, Section 7491.  The burden of proof rules effectively shift the 
burden of proof, in certain tax cases, to the Internal Revenue Service rather than to the 
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taxpayer.  Magro and Stetson (2004) found that, as a result of this shift in burden of 
proof, taxpayers exhibited an increased expectation of success in litigation and an 
increased likelihood that they would engage in more unsound tax-motivated transactions. 
 
Summary 
 
Ethics (moral obligation), tax complexity, tax law equity, framing of the decision 
context, social stigmatization, and audit/litigation success predictions are all variables 
examined in the tax evasion literature that have shown to correlate with taxpayer evasion 
behaviors and decisions.5 
Weigel et al. (1987) and Porcano (1987) present and discuss variables effecting 
taxpayer evasion decisions.  As mentioned above, comparing the variables in these two 
reviews of tax evasion research with variables identified in the taxpayer compliance 
literature, I find that the attributes related to taxpayer compliance and the attributes 
related to tax evasion are highly consistent.  At the outset, this signifies an immediate 
opportunity for further refinement of how we define and examine the distinct constructs 
of compliance and evasion and the resulting variables that may be specifically and/or 
uniquely applicable to each.  
Other Taxpayer Studies   
Although most behavioral, experimental tax research has examined taxpayer 
compliance and evasion correlates, Boylan and Frischmann (2006) examined the role of                                                         5 See Table 3 for a summary of tax evasion research. 
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tax complexity in investment decisions.  In their examination, the authors manipulated 
the complexity for participants to derive their marginal tax rates.  The authors found that 
tax complexity leads to systematically and inefficiently high trading prices and quantities, 
which limited the amount of overall wealth created and systematic transfers of wealth 
between the subjects and the tax authorities increased. 
This is a particularly interesting topic that future research should explore in 
greater depth.  Practically, there have been a number of changes in the tax rates and tax 
rules relating to investment income in recent years.  Have these tax changes contributed 
to greater understanding among investors of their investment tax implications or have 
they led to greater complexity and greater inefficiencies?  How do taxpayers respond to 
changes in investment tax rates?  Do certain taxpayers perceive the tax rate cuts on 
investment income and subsequent capital gains as unfair or inequitable?  Do tax rate 
differences on investment income elicit a socially positive or negative response among 
taxpayers?  Do tax rate reductions on investment income encourage more or less tax 
evasion behaviors among different classes of taxpayers?  The answers to these questions 
may help us influence future tax policy and may lead to greater understanding of the 
reasons for the increasing Tax Gap.   
1.4 Synthesis and Prospective – Taxpayer Behaviors 
 
Taxpayer compliance may be defined as a taxpayer’s intentions, actions, and 
reporting decisions to comply with tax laws, while the lack of compliance 
(noncompliance) could point to either tax avoidance (the legal reduction in taxes by 
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utilizing the tax laws to a taxpayer’s advantage) or tax evasion (illegally not paying 
taxes).  Future research in the taxpayer compliance area should thoughtfully employ 
delineation between the constructs of tax compliance, tax avoidance, and tax evasion to 
avoid confusing the concepts.  While an appreciation for testing in “gray areas” might 
find interesting results, tax evasion is a particularly curious practical construct that 
intrinsically carries potentially substantial risks of penalty, such as possible prison terms, 
etc., and should be tested as such.   
Experimental economic research focuses on creating a laboratory environment in 
which “real world” phenomena are not introduced to the subjects’ cognition.  I argue that 
by removing the pervasive and unique definitional construct of tax evasion, we may be 
destroying external validity in our findings.   
An overall appreciation for how taxpayers interpret their decisions would be 
interesting.  For instance, do taxpayers understand what activities constitute tax 
avoidance versus evasion?  Do they understand the consequences of evasion? Does the 
magnitude (materiality) of the decision change how taxpayers define tax evasion and, 
consequently, effect their decisions?   
Further, examining taxpayers individually does not account for the role of the tax 
professional in most complicated and material tax decisions.  The role of the tax 
professional and the relationship between taxpayer and tax professional are paramount to 
our understanding of overall tax reporting and planning issue.  As such, we now turn our 
attention to the following factor in the tax decision schema: the role of the tax 
professional. 
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1.5 Role of the Tax Professional 
 
Tax professionals may serve to mitigate or reinforce taxpayer decisions and, as 
such, stand as the gatekeepers of tax issues and how they may be reported or resolved.  A 
major area of tax noncompliance and potential evasion, as referenced by the tax gap 
indicators, is in the reporting of itemized deductions, self-employment income, and other 
forms of business income.  The IRS has increased focus on this area by promising to 
scrutinize Schedules A, C, and E and further indicted the role of the tax professional in 
this arena with an increased focus on regulating and sanctioning the tax professional. 
(IRS 2010a)  
Roberts (1998) comprehensively reviews earlier judgment and decision-making 
research as it applies to tax accountants.  The author explains 52 studies, identifying and 
examining 50 potential factors affecting the tax accountants’ decision-making processes.  
Roberts (1998) categorizes these 50 factors into five related groups:  
 
(1) Individual psychology factors, including experience, knowledge, and 
problem-solving ability (cognitive factors) and advocacy, confirmation 
bias, ethical attitude, and risk preference (affective factors);  
(2) Economic risks and rewards associated with the tax accountant’s three 
constituency groups: external regulatory bodies, the client (client 
preference), and the firm;   
(3) Factors describing the decision-making task, such as ambiguity or 
complexity of the tax laws; 
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(4) Factors describing decision-process features, such as the order in which 
information is examined, framing, and effects of pressure, 
accountability, and decision aids on information processing; and 
(5) Factors of specific task outputs: tax compliance (facts are closed and 
cannot be changed) versus tax planning (facts are open and can be 
changed to include more favorable tax treatment) 
 
For consistency, I will generally continue with these categories, highlighting and 
discussing subsequent literature within each category identified above.  In subsequent 
studies of tax professionals, many of the factors identified above are studied across one or 
more of the five factor categorizations.  In these cases, I attribute the study to the factor 
category of the primary manipulation and then discuss the other potential factors 
involved.  
Individual Psychological Factors   
Advocacy and Confirmation Bias 
 
 
Prior research in this area has examined tax professionals’ attitudes about 
advocacy and their own risk propensity and how these factors affect recommendations, 
increase or decrease effort in search behavior, and exhibit confirmation bias in the 
evaluation of facts and circumstances of the decision-making context.  Several 
subsequent studies are discussed below, which examined advocacy attitudes and the 
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resulting impact on tax professional planning and decision processes.  I will start our 
discussion with an introduction to the widely accepted Mason and Levy (2001) general 
advocacy scale. 
Mason and Levy (2001) examined the difference in advocacy attitudes between 
34 CPA’s and 30 IRS agents.  The results of their study led to the development of a nine-
item advocacy scale that measures intrinsic client advocacy.  Several studies have used 
the Mason and Levy (2001) scale, including Kadous and Magro (2001), Davis and Mason 
(2003), Barrick, Cloyd, and Spilker (2004), Kahle and White (2004), and Bobek, 
Hageman, and Hatfield (2010).  Stephenson (2007) and Pinsker, Pennington, and Schafer 
(2009) also utilize the Mason and Levy (2001) scale with exclusion of one or more items 
in the measurement scale. 
Hatfield (2001) examined how the perceived objectivity of the staff accountant 
and the manager’s inherent client advocacy affect the manager’s use of the staff 
accountant’s research report in the forming client recommendations.  The objectivity 
assessment and use of the staff accountant’s research report is influenced by whether the 
research report confirms or disconfirms the manager’s initial opinion (advocacy). 
Barrick, Cloyd, and Spilker (2004) examined the influence of biased tax research 
memoranda on supervisors’ judgments made during the review process.  The authors 
posit that tax professionals orient toward recommendations that meet the joint objectives 
of accuracy and advocacy.  Barrick et al. (2004) found that supervisors are more 
persuaded by an unbiased memorandum (more accurate) when the client-preferred 
position (advocacy) cannot be achieved.  Further, when neither memorandum meets the 
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accuracy objective, supervisors are more persuaded by the memoranda in which the 
advocacy objective might be met. 
Stephenson (2007) examined advocacy levels between CPAs and non-CPAs, as 
measured using the Mason and Levy (2001) scale.  The authors found that advocacy 
levels are fairly equal between CPAs and non-CPAs and that clients of each were found 
to have similar perceptions of the aggressiveness of their preparers.   Namely, tax 
preparers exhibited higher advocacy levels than the advocacy level perceived by their 
clients.  
   Pinsker, Pennington, and Schafer (2009) investigated how training in the role of 
tax professional versus the role of auditor influence advocacy attitudes and how the 
context of the decision environment interacts with advocacy attitudes to influence 
judgment and decision making.  The results of this study indicate that the context of the 
specific decision environment does serve as a moderating effect on advocacy attitudes.  
Specifically, the authors found that judgments of accounting professionals in a tax 
decision environment tie more close to their advocacy attitudes than judgments in audit 
decision environments.  The authors also found that tax professionals are more likely to 
adapt to the professional requirements of advocacy or skepticism than are their audit 
counterparts. 
 Another study indicating the impact of training and attitudes is Cloyd and Spilker 
(2000).  In this study, the authors examined whether academic training may influence the 
extent to which tax researchers are subject to confirmation bias.  Cloyd and Spilker 
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(2000) found that law students were less prone to bias in resolving ambiguous tax 
research issues than were Master of Accounting students.  
 Bobek, Hageman, and Hatfield (2010) examined whether client specific 
characteristics influence the level of advocacy tax professionals’ exhibit and how client-
specific advocacy affects tax professionals’ judgments and decisions.  The authors 
examined the impact of practice risk on tax professionals’ decisions and extend existing 
research by examining the impact of client importance on client advocacy and directly 
measuring general client advocacy and client specific advocacy using the Mason and 
Levy (2001) advocacy scale.  Bobek et al. (2010) also determined whether advocacy 
impacts the judgment decisions of tax professionals.  Bobek et al. (2010) found that 
practice risk impacts client advocacy, recommendations, and allowance of favorable tax 
advice while client importance only impacts the allowance of favorable tax advice and 
not client advocacy or subsequent recommendations. 
 
Knowledge    In prior research, a tax professionals’ level of knowledge has consistently been 
significant in explaining differences in judgment and decision-making performance.  
Several prior studies found that task-specific knowledge was a better indicator of 
improved judgment and decision-making than were years of experience or any other 
experience indicator. (Roberts 1998).  The article below addresses institutional 
knowledge as a feature influencing tax research and planning contexts. 
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Magro (2005) examined the impact of relevance institutional knowledge on 
responses to features of tax-planning and compliance contexts.  Specifically, tax 
professionals with relevant institutional knowledge conducted broader and more 
extensive information searches in planning contexts than compliance contexts, leading to 
increased tax research performance.  Conversely, tax professionals lacking relevant 
institutional knowledge did not exhibit this information search adaptivity and exhibited 
lower tax research performance. 
 
Economic Risk and Reward Factors 
 
Client Preference 
 
Prior research has examined client preference as an inducement for a tax 
practitioner to exhibit increased confirmation bias behavior.  This confirmation bias can 
be strong enough to result in inaccurate assessments of the underlying authoritative 
support for a client-favored position as well as lead tax professionals to make overly 
aggressive recommendations (Cloyd and Spilker 1999).  The authors found that subjects’ 
information searches emphasized cases with conclusions consistent with the client’s 
desired outcome (positive cases) over cases inconsistent with the client’s desired outcome 
(negative cases), despite the fact that the positive cases were no more similar to the 
client’s facts. 
Kahle and White (2004) attempt to examine two decision biases that the authors 
believe exist in the tax professionals’ weighting of evidence in a decision task: tax 
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professionals’ initial beliefs, which the authors define as advocacy, and bias induced by 
client preference.  The authors find that tax professionals are not confirmation prone, but 
are highly susceptible to biases toward client preference.  Kahle and White (2004) also 
find that belief revisions are greater when it supports client preferences, as indicated by 
the tax professionals’ advocacy role.  Cumulatively, subjects weighted evidence with 
potentially positive tax consequences more heavily than evidence with potentially 
negative consequences.  However, contrary to findings related with other decision 
makers, subject discounted evidence that was consistent with their own a priori beliefs. 
 
Practice Risk    
Prior research in the client preference and advocacy areas has indicated that tax 
professionals’ decision-making abilities may be clouded by these constructs and may not 
objectively evaluate tax authorities and evidence relevant to their research and decision 
contexts.  Failure to objectively evaluate the proper tax authority in a decision context 
leads to practice risk exposure.  Practice risk is defined as “exposure to monetary and 
nonmonetary costs of making inappropriate recommendations” (Kadous and Magro 
2001).   Since it appears that no specific categorization of this construct is defined in 
Roberts (1998), I have created a newly defined subcategory entitled practice risk and will 
discuss subsequent literature in this area. 
Kadous and Magro (2001) manipulate practice risk to demonstrate how practice 
risk affects how tax professionals process information in their recommendation-formation 
process.  Specifically, the authors find that tax professionals weight information 
  34 
differently for high-risk clients (weaker recommendation for aggressive tax position) than 
for low-risk (stronger recommendation for aggressive tax position) clients, despite 
identical underlying transactions.  These findings indicate that tax professionals consider 
their own risk of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions ahead of their professional 
responsibilities as client advocates. 
Kadous, Magro, and Spilker (2008) examined whether high practice risk mitigates 
the effects of client preferences (confirmation bias towards client preferences) in tax 
professionals’ information search and subsequent judgments.  The authors find that tax 
professionals’ searches, when facing a client with low practice risk, are biased in a 
manner leading to judgments consistent with client preferences; however, when facing a 
client with high practice risk, the search is less biased toward client preferences.  Kadous 
et al., (2008) also found that, after controlling for the impact of client search, tax 
professionals ultimately adjusted their recommendations away from client preferences, 
regardless of the level of designated practice risk. 
 
Penalties 
   
The effect of penalties in prior research has produced mixed results.  Some tax 
professionals exhibit less aggressive decision-making when the chances for penalties and 
sanctions are higher (increased economic and noneconomic costs), but some tax 
professionals display psychological rewards from “playing the game” and beating the 
IRS. (Roberts 1998)   
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Anderson and Cuccia (2000) examine the economic incentive effects of tax return 
preparer penalties.  Contrary to earlier studies, the authors find that an increase in tax 
return preparer penalties provides incentives for practitioners to identify fewer tax-
reducing opportunities, reduce the aggressiveness of their reporting recommendations, 
and increase their fees.  The authors also find that these economic incentives may be 
moderated by the presence of environmental competition and moral hazard. 
 
Task Input Factors 
 
Precedent/Amount of Legal Authority  
Tax input factors, such as ambiguity, complexity of tax law, amounts of legal 
authority, etc., have been examined in prior literature and have been found to effect the 
judgment and decision-making abilities of tax professionals.  The study described below 
contributes to task input literature by examining the effect of precedent on a tax 
professionals’ judgment. 
Davis and Mason (2003) formulate and test a psychological feature-matching 
model that describes how tax professionals evaluate precedent from prior court decisions 
and administrative rulings.  The authors then used this model to predict how tax authority 
judgments would be influenced by taxpayer advocacy, the relative amount of detail 
known about the client fact situation, precedent, and asymmetry.  Davis and Mason 
(2003) found that factors such as taxpayer advocacy, the relative amount of details known 
about the client fact situation, and precedent influence tax professionals’ judgment 
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regarding the similarity of precedent to the client fact situation.  Specifically, the outcome 
of the court case had a stronger influence on the likelihood of success judgment as 
similarity of the client fact situation and precedent increased, but the results were only 
sensitive to the common features and not the distinctive features of the client fact 
situation or precedent.  In addition, the authors find that taxpayer advocacy may influence 
similarity judgments and authority when studied with the joint influence of the outcome 
of the court case presented in the study. 
 
Cognitive Processing Factors 
 
Source Credibility 
 
Framing and information order have been examined in prior research studies.  
Source credibility examines the impact of the origin of the information and the relative 
weight the tax professional places on the information contained in the source.  The 
following study contributes to literature examining cognitive processing factors on tax 
professionals’ decision-making processes. 
Alexander (2003) examined how strategy memorandum from local staff versus 
the National Tax Office (NTO) and the type of engagement (client-initiated versus firm-
initiated) affected both the extent of the tax professionals’ subsequent review of the 
proposed tax-saving strategy and the difference in the tax professionals’ assessed 
likelihood of litigation success before and after conducting the review.  Specifically, the 
author found that the most extensive reviews were conducted when the engagement was 
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firm-initiated and the memorandum came from the NTO and the least extensive reviews 
were found when the engagement was firm-initiated with a local office memorandum or 
when the engagement was client-initiated with a NTO memorandum.  The smallest 
change in assessed likelihood of success in litigation was in the condition where review 
was most extensive and the memorandum was issued by the NTO; whereas, the largest 
change in assessed likelihood was in the condition where the review was relatively 
limited and the memorandum was prepared by local office staff. 
 
Task Output Factors 
 
Planning versus Compliance Decision Contexts  
Prior research has generally found that tax preparers exploit ambiguity in tax rules 
to help clients reach favorable reporting positions in tax compliance situations.  Spilker, 
Worsham, and Prawitt (1999) extend this research by examining whether tax 
professionals differ in their aggressiveness stance between tax compliance and tax 
planning contexts.  The authors confirm previous findings that tax professionals interpret 
ambiguity more aggressively to the benefit of the taxpayer in tax compliance situations, 
but relatively conservatively in tax planning situations. 
 Another study examines the identification of significant differing features 
between the tax compliance and tax planning contexts.  In general, tax planning involves 
greater complexity, ambiguity, and justifiability demands than do compliance issues.  
Magro (1999) examined this identification of features and found that experienced tax 
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professionals rated tax planning cases higher in complexity, ambiguity, and justifiability 
demands than tax compliance cases.  In addition, tax managers budgeted more time in tax 
planning contexts.  
1.6 Synthesis and Prospective – The Role of the Tax Professional  
Similar to taxpayer compliance and evasion studies, research of tax professionals 
has also examined piecemeal factors and has failed to offer a unifying theory that 
provides a comprehensive theory of tax professional behavior.6  However, these studies 
seem to have somewhat stronger theoretical foundations for their particular manipulations 
than their counterpart studies of taxpayers.  Although this is a minor improvement, my 
overall suggestions for the future of taxpayer compliance and evasion studies also hold 
for experimental, behavioral research of tax professionals. 
Tax professionals consist of a varied group of individuals, including CPA firms of 
varying sizes, enrolled agents, and non-certified preparers.  Given that behavioral 
research has examined the quality of CPA firm firms by size, future research of tax 
professionals should examine whether differences exists among the diverse groups of 
preparers and what factors may mitigate these differences.                                                              6 See Table 4 for a summary of tax professional research. 
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1.7 Synthesis and Prospective – Behavioral Tax Research  
The aim of this study is to survey and provide a comprehensive review of 
behavioral, experimental tax research; examine the contributions of prior research in this 
area; and identify areas that may be fruitful for future scholars of behavioral, 
experimental tax research.  Given that individual income taxes account for about 45% of 
total tax revenues in the United States, individual income tax is the single largest source 
of the annual tax gap, and the recognition that there is limited archival data for individual 
taxpayers and tax preparers, experimental, behavioral tax research affords researchers the 
unique opportunity to understand the decisions, motivations, and actions of stakeholders, 
such as taxpayers and tax professionals, in the tax planning, compliance, and decision 
processes. 
 Overall, this review hints at the concept that behavioral, experimental tax 
research, for both taxpayers and tax professionals, is progressing without a cohesive 
theoretical and practical supporting web.  As noted in my summaries of taxpayer 
behaviors and the role of the tax professional, there have been four literature reviews that 
have called for a comprehensive framework of behavioral tax research and no study to 
date has answered these calls.  Rather than providing this framework, research 
subsequent to these reviews has examined piecemeal factors of taxpayer compliance and 
the judgment and decision making decisions of tax professionals.  To develop theories for 
both taxpayer and tax professional decision-making, I believe it is imperative that our 
focus on theory development shift to recognizing practical and fundamental tax and 
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accounting concepts.  For example, when Watts and Zimmerman (1978) developed 
Positive Accounting Theory in the for-profit arena and Zimmerman (1977) developed a 
theory for municipal accounting, these approaches helped the development of a 
theoretical framework that was grounded/supported by practice. To this end, future 
research could exploit the underpinnings of the tax environment and examine taxpayer 
and tax professional behavior in relation to recent tax court cases and administrative 
rulings, tax law changes, and new IRS initiatives.    
 Given that most sophisticated taxpayers hire tax professionals and the impact of 
tax professionals on taxpayer avoidance and evasion has recently become a key focus of 
the IRS, future research should examine the interactions of taxpayers and tax 
professionals together.  We should recognize that, from a practical perspective, this 
interaction involves an iterative give and take process.  Future experimental, behavioral 
tax research should consider drawing on the negotiation literature to examine the give 
and take process between taxpayer and tax professional. 
 Although there are significant areas of improvement necessary in experimental, 
behavioral tax research, these shortcomings may offer significant opportunities for future 
research in the area.  Looking forward, the primary aim of this study is to provide a 
framework to extend this important area of research.  
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CHAPTER 2: ESSAY TWO 
IRS Oversight, Client Risk, and Tax Professionals: Does 
Increased Control Deter Aggressive Decision Making? 
 
 
2.1 Abstract 
 
 The Internal Revenue Service has recently increased its monitoring of tax 
professionals by implementing a new direct oversight program, which includes visits to 
tax preparer offices for the first time in 2010.  Although deterrence theory suggests that 
these recent provisions will increase compliance, extant literature on control theory 
suggests that increasing controls often has the unintended effect of causing an increase in 
the aggressive behaviors the controls aim to constrain.  Using an experiment with tax 
professionals at a national tax conference, I find evidence that tax professionals increase 
the aggressiveness of their recommendations and report higher advocacy intentions when 
presented with high direct IRS oversight, although this desire appears to be tempered by 
the client’s perceived risk tolerance.  Additionally, the results suggest that practice risk 
impacts the final recommendations of tax professionals, but may only be an effective 
deterrent against aggressive decision making for high risk taxpayers, which only accounts 
for a small portion of the taxpayer population.  The results should be useful for regulators 
as they consider the optimal type and level of tax preparer oversight and the expanded 
levels of practice risk should be beneficial to future research in this area.   
 
 
 
 
 42 
2.2 Introduction 
 
As tax laws have become more complex and the majority of taxpayers now rely 
on the services of tax professionals, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has increased its 
focus on tax preparer regulation.1  In 2009, the IRS modified their regulatory efforts by 
announcing an unprecedented and systematic plan to begin direct monitoring and 
oversight of paid preparers (IRS 2010a).  While prior IRS efforts focused solely on 
increasing preparer penalties and passing more rigorous standards of conduct, these new 
measures have completely altered the landscape of regulatory enforcement with the IRS 
visiting tax preparer offices and reviewing client files for the first time in 2010 (JOA 
2011).  The IRS notes that these regulatory efforts are aimed at enforcing taxpayer 
compliance through tax preparers and ensuring uniform and high ethical standards of 
conduct for tax preparers (IRS 2009a, 2010d). 
Although the IRS has increased its focus on tax preparer regulation, prior 
research, to my knowledge, has not examined the impact of the direct monitoring and 
oversight of tax preparers.  Additionally, earlier studies examining the effects of audit 
probability and penalties provide conflicting evidence on the impact of tax preparer 
regulation.2  Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of these 
unprecedented direct oversight initiatives on (1) tax preparer recommendations and (2) 
                                                        1 According to IRS Publication 4822, the percentage of returns filed by a paid preparer was 59.33% in 
2009. (IRS 2011a) 2 Earlier studies include Anderson and Cuccia (2000); Cloyd and Spilker (1999); Cuccia (1994a); 
Newberry, Reckers, and Wyndelts (1993); Reckers, Sanders, and Wyndelts (1991); Kaplan, Reckers, West, 
and Boyd (1988). 
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client advocacy intentions and (3) to determine whether these effects vary with client risk 
characteristics.  Using an experiment with 151 tax professionals at a national tax 
conference, I manipulate two important variables in a tax professional’s decision-making 
environment (regulatory environment/oversight and client characteristics).3  Consistent 
with IRS provisions, I manipulate oversight at two levels [high (tax preparer has received 
a letter from the IRS and has been officially selected for a visit from the IRS) and low 
(tax preparer has not received a letter from the IRS and will not be visited)].  Also, given 
the importance of client characteristics in a tax professional’s decision-making process 
(Milliron 1988), I define and manipulate practice risk at three levels (low/moderate/high) 
by varying client characteristics such as completeness of records, client responsiveness, 
and incidence of prior audit.  In addition to providing evidence regarding the effects of 
direct IRS oversight on tax preparer recommendations, I build upon prior research on 
advocacy (Bobek, Hageman, and Hatfield 2010; Mason and Levy 2001) by examining 
the impact of direct IRS oversight on a tax preparer’s client advocacy intentions.  Finally, 
I extend prior research on practice risk (Kadous, Magro, and Spilker 2008; Kadous and 
Magro 2001) by examining and parsing out the effects of specific client characteristics on 
a tax professional’s final recommendations and advocacy intentions.   
The IRS has historically behaved in a manner consistent with deterrence theory, 
which suggests that increasing (1) the severity of punishment, (2) the probability of 
punishment, and (3) the certainty of detection will increase tax compliance (Butterfield 
                                                        3 Interviews with tax professionals at Big Four, regional, and local CPA firms suggest that the primary 
considerations in a tax professional’s decision-making process are the regulatory environment and client 
characteristics.   
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2002; Newberry et al. 1993; Witte and Woodbury 1985).  Initially, the IRS focused on 
increasing the severity and probability of punishment by working to tighten penalties, 
sanctions, and standards of care over tax professionals (IRC Section 6694).  Recently, the 
IRS has focused on increasing the certainty of detection through direct oversight of tax 
preparers, which engages the third prong of deterrence theory.  This direct oversight 
should be especially effective given that scholars examining deterrence theory have 
found that the certainty of detection is significantly more important than the severity of 
punishment (Eide 1994; Decker and Kohfeld 1990; Witte 1983).  
While increasing the certainty of detection should lead to a decrease in aggressive 
behavior according to the tenets of deterrence theory, the inherent advocacy role of tax 
professionals and their intermediary role between the IRS and taxpayers may cause 
unexpected reactions to increased IRS control.  According to extant literature on control 
theory, increasing controls often has the unintended effect of causing an increase in the 
aggressive behaviors the controls aim to constrain because they are perceived as a sign of 
distrust destroying goodwill between the parties (Christ 2008; Falk and Kosfeld 2006).  
Therefore, extant literature on control theory and results from earlier tax studies, finding 
a positive or no significant relationship between increased regulatory risk (Cloyd and 
Spilker 1999) or increased threat of economic sanction (Cuccia 1994a) and aggressive tax 
reporting, suggest that tax preparers may act more aggressively in the presence of direct 
oversight by the IRS.  Hence, this study attempts to reconcile the divergence between the 
IRS' intended application of deterrence theory and the implicit control relationship that 
tax professionals may perceive and respond to. 
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 The results provide evidence that the current IRS oversight program may not 
work as intended on the professional tax community.  In fact, consistent with extant 
literature on control theory, as IRS direct oversight increases, tax professionals increase 
their levels of aggressiveness in tax decision making and recommendations.  These 
results are consistent with a tax practitioner’s desire to challenge the IRS (Roberts 1998; 
Cuccia 1994b) or a building-up of negotiating position with the IRS (Slemrod 2007).  
Further, the results suggest that tax professionals increase their reported advocacy levels 
when presented with high direct IRS oversight which is consistent with a tax preparer’s 
increased willingness to fight for client positions when faced with higher IRS scrutiny.   
 Kadous and Magro (2001) introduce a relative concept of practice risk, defined 
by varying client characteristics that may alter a tax professional’s decision-making.  
Prior research on practice risk finds that tax professionals adjust their final 
recommendations away from the client preferred position for both low and high risk 
profiles, suggesting that practice risk may not impact a tax professional’s final 
recommendations4 (Kadous et al. 2008).  In this study, I extend research on practice risk 
by further parsing out specific client attributes that alter the final recommendations of tax 
professionals.  I operationalize practice risk at three levels (low/moderate/high).  The 
results build on the importance of practice risk, suggesting that practice risk does impact 
tax professionals’ final recommendations.  Specifically, at low IRS oversight levels, there 
is a significant difference in recommendations between low and moderate practice risk 
clients and between moderate and high practice risk clients, with tax professionals                                                         4 The authors find that practice risk impacts information search, but, contrary to their hypothesized predictions, the authors find that practice risk does not alter final recommendations.  
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becoming significantly less aggressive moving from low to moderate to high practice 
risk.  However, the results suggest that practice risk may only be an effective deterrent 
against aggressive decision-making when tax professionals encounter the high practice 
risk level, which accounts for only six percent of the taxpayer population.5   
The results also suggest an interaction effect between IRS oversight and practice 
risk.  Specifically, when faced with high IRS oversight, tax professionals become 
significantly more aggressive in their final recommendations for moderate and high 
practice risk taxpayers; however, high IRS oversight has no significant impact on a tax 
professional’s recommendations for low practice risk clients.  The results suggest that a 
tax professional’s desire to be more aggressive, as a reaction to increased control, may be 
tempered by the perceived risk tolerance of the client.  Future research should examine 
the specific client attributes causing this perception of higher risk tolerance.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, to my knowledge, 
this is the first study to examine whether the direct monitoring of tax preparers under the 
tenets of deterrence theory is useful in increasing tax compliance.  Given the inherent 
conflict between the roles of advocate for the client and enforcer for the IRS, the findings 
suggest that the current IRS oversight program may not be appropriate for controlling the 
general tax preparer population.  These findings should be especially useful for regulators 
                                                        5 As a validation measure for each manipulation of practice risk (low/moderate/high) in this study, each 
participant was asked to estimate the percentage of their current tax clients that are similar to the given 
client profile. Each tax professional received and responded to only one client profile. Cumulatively, 144 
tax professionals estimated the percent of similar clients to the low/moderate/high practice risk profiles as 
64.20 percent/31.33 percent/6.04 percent on a 100 percent scale.   
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as they consider the optimal type and level of tax preparer oversight, especially given that 
the IRS has consistently behaved in a manner consistent with deterrence theory. 
Second, I demonstrate that high IRS oversight leads to higher advocacy intentions 
and that advocacy intentions remain high for the majority of a tax professional’s client 
base.  These results provide evidence of an increased “us versus them” mentality and 
support a tax professional’s motivation to make more aggressive recommendations in the 
presence of high IRS oversight.  On the whole, the results indicate a strong adherence to 
the professional standard of advocacy, which may make tax professional attitudes 
impermeable to the IRS’ attempts to utilize them as implicit agents of taxpayer 
enforcement. 
Finally, the results on practice risk should be useful to future researchers as this 
concept continues to evolve.  I provide evidence of the impact of specific client 
characteristics, such as incidence of prior IRS audit and a history of significant litigation, 
on a tax professional’s final recommendations.  The results enable researchers to 
understand which components may be important to manipulate in future studies and 
should compel additional research on whether practice risk impacts other factors such as 
tax fees and client retention.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides institutional 
background regarding IRS regulation, Section III develops theory and hypotheses, 
Section IV describes the research method, Section V presents the results, and Section VI 
concludes the paper.  
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2.3 Institutional Background 
 
In 2007, Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 6694 was amended to increase 
both the severity and probability of punishment of tax professionals for understatements 
due to unreasonable positions.  These revisions included widening the scope of penalty 
enforcement, increasing penalty amounts, and modifying the standard of conduct from a 
“realistic possibility” to a “more likely than not” standard.6  Although these changes 
represented a significant increase in the severity and probability of punishment, in 2009, 
Douglas Shulman, Commissioner of the IRS, announced an unprecedented and 
systematic plan to begin the direct monitoring and oversight of paid tax preparers.  The 
Commissioner noted that these provisions will “help the IRS better leverage the tax 
return preparer community with the twin goals of increasing taxpayer compliance and 
ensuring uniform and high ethical standards of conduct for tax preparers” (IRS 2009a, 
2010a).   
In January 2010, the IRS issued over 10,000 letters to tax professionals across the 
country who prepare a large volume of tax returns where errors are commonly seen7. 
These letters notified tax preparers of their responsibilities to file accurate returns, 
outlined the consequences of filing incorrect returns, and notified the preparers of a 
potential IRS field visit. (IRS 2010c)  Later in 2010, the IRS conducted approximately                                                         
6 First-tier penalties (for unreasonable positions) were increased from $250 to the greater of $1000 or 50 
percent of the income derived by the tax return preparer.  Second-tier penalties (for willful or reckless 
conduct) were increased from $1000 to the greater of $5000 or 50 percent of the income derived by the tax 
return preparer.  The “realistic possibility standard” required a one-in-three likelihood that the reported tax 
position would be sustained on its merits, while the increased “more likely than not standard” requires a 
better than 50 percent chance that the reported tax position will be sustained on its merits. 
7 Tax returns with Schedules A, C, or E. 
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5,000 field visits of these tax return preparers.  During these visits at preparer offices, the 
IRS inquired regarding the firm’s general procedures for handling taxpayer data and 
reviewing the accuracy of each return, quizzed the tax preparer on IRC Section 6694, and 
reviewed a random sample of tax returns and supporting documents (JOA 2011).  In 
2010, these visits led to 56 indictments, 25 convictions, and 21 civil injunctions. (IRS 
2010c).  Building on their efforts in 2010, the IRS sent out an additional 10,000 letters for 
2011, with plans to visit more than 2,500 additional preparers during the year. (IRS 
2011b)  Beginning their third year of implementation in November 2011, the IRS 
increased the scope of their oversight initiatives, sending letters to approximately 21,000 
tax preparers with plans for numerous oversight field visits during 2012 (IRS 2011c).8,9 
 
2.4 Theory and Hypothesis Development 
IRS Oversight 
Prior research examining IRS regulatory activities toward tax professionals has 
reported conflicting results.  Certain earlier studies examining the effects of audit 
probability and penalties on tax preparer judgment and decision-making find that higher 
audit probabilities and increased penalties have a significant impact on reducing the 
                                                        
8 The results of the 2011 and 2012 visits (second and third year of the oversight initiatives) have not been 
published. 9 CAMICO, the largest CPA‐directed program of liability insurance for accounting professionals in the U.S., suggests that policyholders selected for an IRS office visit should contact CAMICO’s loss prevention department immediately to determine what would be appropriate to produce to the IRS during a compliance visit, as well as how to appropriately address the requests for production of confidential client information. 
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aggressiveness of tax professionals’ recommendations.10  Conversely, several studies find 
that manipulating the probability of IRS audit (Cloyd and Spilker 1999) or increasing the 
threat of economic sanctions (Cuccia 1994a) has no significant effect on tax professional 
decision-making and recommendations11.  Further, Cuccia (1994b) and Roberts (1998) 
argue that, in the adversarial setting of tax practice, increasing penalties can create a 
competitive game with the IRS, with intrinsic psychological rewards for playing the 
game and beating the IRS.  Slemrod (2007) also suggests that tax professionals may 
consider an aggressive tax position to be an “opening bid”, understanding that any 
ultimate resolution may be a lengthy process of negotiation.  
Extant literature on tax preparer decision-making presumes that the IRS acts in 
accordance with deterrence theory (Butterfield 2002; Newberry et al. 1993; Witte and 
Woodbury 1985).  Deterrence theory (Becker 1968) suggests that increasing (1) the 
severity of punishment, (2) the probability of punishment, and (3) the certainty of 
detection should deter an individual from making aggressive tax reporting decisions and, 
hence, increase tax compliance.  Amendments to IRC Section 6694 in 2007, which 
widened the scope of penalty enforcement, significantly increased penalty amounts, and 
modified the standard of conduct for tax professionals, engaged two prongs of deterrence 
theory by significantly increasing both the severity and probability of punishment.  
Subsequently, in 2009, the IRS oversight plan engaged the third prong of deterrence 
theory by increasing the certainty of detection through the direct monitoring and                                                         10 These studies include McGill 1990; Reckers et al. 1991; Newberry et al. 1993; Roberts and Cargile 
1994; Kaplan et al. 1988; and Anderson and Cuccia 2000. 11 Cuccia (1994a) finds that increased penalty threats resulted in CPAs recommending significantly more aggressive positions, although the results were not statistically significant.  
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oversight of tax preparers (IRS 2010a).  These newly implemented oversight initiatives 
should provide for the greatest enforcement effectiveness, given prior research on 
deterrence theory, which finds that increasing the certainty of detection may be the most 
important factor in deterring unwanted behaviors (Eide 1994; Decker and Kohfeld 1990; 
Witte 1983). 
While the tenets of deterrence theory suggest that increasing the certainty of 
detection should provide for a decrease in aggressive behaviors, tax preparers may 
perceive the implicit increase in IRS control as a sign of distrust or an intrusion to their 
professional environment and may react negatively.  Control theory, stemming from 
sociology, suggests that absent societal or institutional bonds, people act opportunistically 
to get what they desire.  Therefore, centralized (bureaucratic) control is necessary and 
must be maintained through administrative measures, such as setting additional standards 
or policies.  Extant literature on control theory, however, finds that increasing controls to 
force compliance may be perceived as a signal of distrust by the controlled party, which 
often leads to harmful and dysfunctional effects (Christ 2008; Falk and Kosfeld 2006; 
Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2006).  Further, Christ et al. (2006) and Christ, Sedatole, 
Towry, and Thomas (2008)12 find that, as the perception of scrutiny increases and/or the 
controls become more intrusive, trust is eroded, increasing the risk of noncooperation.  
As a result, the IRS’ imposition of direct monitoring and oversight of tax preparers may 
increase the perception of both increased scrutiny and increased intrusiveness.   Both of 
these perceptions have the potential to negatively impact trust and cooperation, leading to                                                         12 These control studies examine and discuss the effects of controls on management, employees, business 
partners, business associates, and on collaborative relationships, such as alliances between organizations. 
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the potential for tax preparers to increase aggressive behaviors as a reaction to increased 
IRS control.  These aggressive behaviors may be especially acute given the inherent 
advocacy role of tax professionals and their intermediary role between the IRS and 
taxpayers.  Figure 1 illustrates the inherent advocacy role of tax professionals and the 
potentially counterproductive relationship between deterrence pressure from the IRS and 
control reactions from tax professionals.  
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Hence, according to the basic tenets of deterrence theory, increasing the detection 
rates of aggressive tax reporting decisions should decrease aggressive decision-making; 
however, extant literature on control theory suggests that increasing controls over the tax 
preparer population may cause unexpected and potentially contradictory reactions to 
control, leading to an increase in aggressive decision making as control increases.  
Therefore, two competing arguments have the potential to explain how these new IRS 
oversight initiatives may impact a tax professional’s decision making, leading to the 
following competing hypotheses: 
 
H1a (deterrence theory): As IRS oversight increases, tax professionals will make 
less aggressive (client favorable) recommendations. 
 
H1b (control theory): As IRS oversight increases, tax professionals will make 
more aggressive (client favorable) recommendations. 
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Advocacy 
 Hypothesis one examines the impact of IRS oversight on tax professionals’ 
recommendations.  Although the final recommendation is a critical decision, Bobek et al. 
(2010) note the construct of advocacy plays a critical part in tax judgment and decision 
making research given that a primary role of tax professionals is to advocate for their 
client.  Advocacy can also serve as a signal of the underlying motivation in forming the 
final recommendation.  Given the importance of this construct, I examine the impact of 
IRS oversight on advocacy measures, which have been significantly linked to 
professional recommendations and judgment processes in prior literature (Bobek et al. 
2010; Kahle and White 2004; Davis and Mason 2003; Mason and Levy 2001). 
 Client advocacy, as defined by prior tax literature, “is a state of mind in which 
one feels one’s primary loyalty belongs to the taxpayer.  It is exhibited by a desire to 
represent the taxpayer zealously within the bounds of the law, and by a desire to be a 
fighter on behalf of the taxpayer” (Mason and Levy 2001).  Advocacy is unique to the tax 
profession in that tax preparers have both the “right and responsibility to be an advocate 
for the taxpayer” when recommending a tax return position. (AICPA 2009)   
Extant literature has examined the effects of advocacy directly (Kahle and White 
2004; Davis and Mason 2003; Mason and Levy 2001) or inferred it as support for biases 
in judgment (Cloyd and Spilker 1999).  Bobek et al. (2010) extend this line of research 
finding evidence that client advocacy influences preparer decision-making and, 
 54 
furthermore, that advocacy is at least partially client and context specific.13  While Bobek 
et al. (2010) find support that client characteristics, as an endogenous factor, impact 
advocacy measures and decision-making, Schafer (2010) suggests that future research 
should examine external influences, beyond client characteristics, that may impact a tax 
preparer’s client advocacy.    
Hence, I examine whether IRS oversight (as an external influence) impacts client 
advocacy intentions and, as such, serves as an underlying motivation for the 
recommendation decisions measured in hypothesis one.  Specifically, according to the 
tenets of deterrence theory, increased risk exposure resulting from imminent (high) IRS 
oversight should decrease a tax professional’s advocacy intentions, especially given that 
increasing the certainty of detection has been found to be the most important factor in 
deterring unwanted behavior.  However, in accord with extant literature on control 
theory, IRS oversight could also increase advocacy intentions, with tax professionals 
demonstrating an increased intention to “fight for” their client’s position or an increased 
“us versus them” mentality, leading to the following competing hypotheses: 
 
H2a (deterrence theory): As IRS oversight increases, tax professionals will report 
lower client advocacy intentions. 
 
H2b (control theory): As IRS oversight increases, tax professionals will report 
higher client advocacy intentions. 
                                                           
13 Bobek et al. (2010) introduce the concept of client-specific advocacy.  I extend this concept of client-
specific advocacy, measuring advocacy intentions, specific to each client, across each oversight and 
practice risk manipulation. 
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Practice Risk  
Prior research (Kadous and Magro 2001; Kadous et al. 2008) suggests that 
practice risk is significantly impacted by client characteristics.  Specifically, clients that 
are uncooperative, frequently involved in litigation, and have incomplete records are high 
practice risk clients that expose tax professionals to greater monetary and nonmonetary 
costs for making inappropriate recommendations.  Given that tax professionals should 
recognize and respond to these risks, higher levels of practice risk should motivate tax 
professionals to engage in a more comprehensive and balanced decision process, 
resulting in less biased decision-making.   
Prior studies have defined practice risk at two levels (low and high), finding that 
high practice risk mitigates recommendations of an IRS challenge (Kadous and Magro 
2001) and mitigates confirmation bias (Kadous et al. 2008).  However, Kadous et al. 
(2008) find, contrary to their hypothesized expectations, that tax professionals adjust their 
recommendations away from client preference, irrespective of practice risk.14  In order to 
build upon Kadous et al. (2008) and expand research on practice risk, I operationalize 
practice risk at three levels, creating new characterizations of low and moderate practice 
risk profiles while replicating Kadous et al.’s (2008) definition of high practice risk as an 
anchor to prior research.15 16 
                                                        14 The authors find that practice risk impacts information search, but, contrary to their hypothesized predictions, the authors find that practice risk does not alter final recommendations.  
15 As a validation measure for each manipulation of practice risk (low/moderate/high) in this study, each 
participant was asked to assess the perceived risk level of the client profile and the percentage of their 
current tax clients that are similar to the given client profile. Each tax professional received and responded 
to only one client profile.  Cumulatively, 144 tax professionals rated the perceived risk level of the 
low/moderate/high practice risk taxpayer profiles as 1.93/4.94/5.82 on a scale ranging from lowest (1) to 
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This study operationalizes low practice risk without any incidence of prior audit.  
IRS data reveal that 143 million individual income tax returns were filed with the IRS in 
2007 while 1,384,563 individual returns were audited in 2007, representing a less than 
one percent (.009682) chance of audit for an individual taxpayer in 2007 (IRS 2009b, 
2010b).  Given this evidence, tax practitioners may identify a taxpayer who has been 
previously audited by the IRS as a higher risk taxpayer.  As a result, I define low practice 
risk with the following statement: “They have a history of responding timely to requests 
for information and documentation, usually provide complete records when requested, 
have no history of prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner 
or others in litigation.” 
Additionally, I define moderate practice risk by eliminating any history of 
engaging their tax practitioner and others in litigation.  While litigation would increase 
practice risk, interviews with tax professionals at Big Four, regional, and local CPA firms 
suggest that this scenario may be viewed as unacceptable given that tax professionals are 
rarely sued by tax clients.  Further, I believe it is worthwhile to determine the impact of 
an IRS audit without confounding it with the presence of significant litigation.  
Therefore, I define moderate practice risk with the following statement: “They have a 
history of responding slowly or failing to respond to requests for information or 
documentation, usually provide incomplete records when requested, have been unable to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
highest (7) risk.  Cumulatively, 144 tax professionals also noted the percent of similar clients of the 
low/moderate/high practice risk profiles as 64.20 percent/31.33 percent/6.04 percent on a 100 percent scale. 16 See Table 1 for the full definitions of practice risk used in prior studies.  
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defend tax positions during prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax 
practitioner or others in litigation.” 
 Finally, as an anchor to prior research, I replicate the definition of high practice 
risk used in Kadous et al. (2008) with the following statement: “They have a history of 
responding slowly or failing to respond to requests for information or documentation, 
have been unable to defend tax positions during prior IRS audits, and have a history of 
engaging their prior tax practitioner and others in litigation.”  In sum, I capture varying 
sensitivity to practice risk at three levels, leading to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3a: As practice risk increases, tax professionals will be less likely to make 
aggressive (client favorable) recommendations. 
 
 Further, Bobek et al. (2010) examine practice risk at two levels (low and high) 
and find that tax professionals exhibit lower levels of client-specific advocacy for high 
practice risk clients.  Since this study expands the definition of practice risk to three 
levels (low/moderate/high), I build upon prior research in this area by extending 
sensitivity to practice risk and examining the impact on advocacy measures at each level 
of practice risk, leading to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3b: Client-specific advocacy intentions will decrease as practice risk increases. 
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2.5 Research Methodology      I examine the hypotheses using an experiment in which tax professionals were 
asked to make recommendations on two client fact scenarios (ambiguous and non-
ambiguous)17.  Both IRS oversight risk (2 levels) and practice risk (3 levels) were 
manipulated between participants within the experimental materials.   
 
Participants 
The participants are practicing tax professionals recruited at a national tax 
conference.18  This method of recruitment provides for a large sample of experienced tax 
professionals who regularly deal with and make decisions on individual taxpayer issues 
and who are unlikely to be biased by geographic location or any singular firm size, 
training, or practice philosophy.  I recruited 153 participants out of 281 in attendance at 
the conference.  Two (2) tax professionals were excluded from the experiment because 
they had been through an IRS oversight audit, leaving 151 out of 281 (54% response rate) 
tax professionals who completed the experiment.  Of those, 7 failed manipulation checks 
or had incomplete data, resulting in 144 usable participant instruments. 
Of the 144 participants, the experience level ranged from 2 to 22 years, with a 
mean experience level of 4.36 years; 49.3 percent possessed a master’s degree or MBA; 
46.5 percent held a bachelor’s degree; and 71.5 percent held a current CPA license.                                                          
17 The non-ambiguous scenario is used as a baseline control measure to validate the robustness of the 
results and to rule out the potential for alternative explanations.  See the discussion of the baseline control 
measure in the additional analysis section of the paper. 
18 Approval was granted for the use of human subjects in this experiment by the institution where this 
experiment was conducted. 
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Participants were primarily employed by national accounting firms (22.2 percent), 
regional accounting firms (45.8 percent), and local accounting firms (29.2 percent) and 
held the title of staff or experienced staff (33.3 percent), senior (51.4 percent), and 
manager or senior manager (11.8 percent).19 20 
 
Experimental Design 
The experiment employs a 2 x 3 full factorial design, manipulating two levels of 
oversight risk (low and high) and three levels of practice risk (low/moderate/high).  In 
addition to the between subjects manipulations of oversight risk and practice risk, I asked 
each participant to respond to both an ambiguous and a non-ambiguous decision.21  
In this study, the imminent (high) oversight condition is manipulated with a 
statement that the tax preparer and/or their firm received a letter from the IRS that they 
might be visited and, subsequently, were notified that they had been officially selected 
for a visit from the IRS during 2011.  Conversely, the general (low) oversight condition is 
manipulated with a statement that the tax preparer and/or their firm have not received a 
letter from the IRS in either 2010 or 2011 and will not be visited during 2011.  The three 
manipulations of practice risk (low/moderate/high) were described in detail in the Theory 
and Hypothesis Development Section and are summarized in  Table 1. 
 [Insert Table 1]                                                         
19 I also conducted a pilot study with 84 graduating accounting majors at a leading four-year university and 
12 practicing tax professionals with similar results.  The results of the pilot study provided timely feedback 
and helped to refine the instrument and determine proper procedures for conducting the experiment with 
tax professionals. 20 The results do not differ significantly when I control for experience, age, gender, or any of the 
demographic measurements. 
21 All participants received both the non-ambiguous and ambiguous scenarios. I alternated the order of 
presentation to control for order effects and order does not influence the results. 
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Experimental Procedures 
 I provided participants with a research instrument containing two parts (Part A 
and Part B).  In Part A, participants were first provided with a brief introduction to the 
new IRS oversight initiatives, then given a statement with the manipulated oversight level 
(high/low) that would apply to both parts of the experiment.  Next, the participants were 
provided with a short client vignette, including the manipulated level of practice risk 
(low/moderate/high), followed by a summary of pertinent facts about the taxpayers’ 
issue22 and appropriate IRS regulations for reference to support their decisions.  
Participants were asked to read the significant facts of the case, review the appropriate 
tax authority related to the tax scenario, and make a recommendation on hobby versus 
business treatment for the tax issue.  Then, participants were asked to answer questions 
about the riskiness of the decision, the riskiness and similarity of the client profile, and 
other issues related to their decision.  Participants then completed the Mason and Levy 
(2001) advocacy scale specific to their client scenario.23  Upon completion of all of the 
above (Part A), participants turned in Part A and then completed Part B24.  Part B 
contained the second client vignette and participants were reminded of their IRS 
oversight level (high/low), asked to read the significant facts of the case, review the 
appropriate tax authority, and make a recommendation. Then, participants were asked to 
answer questions about the riskiness of the decision, the riskiness and similarity of the 
                                                        
22 See Appendix A for the ambiguous and non-ambiguous client fact scenarios. 23 Consistent with the concept of client-specific advocacy introduced by Bobek et al. (2010), the Mason 
and Levy (2001) advocacy scale was administered by replacing the general term “taxpayer” with the 
hypothetical client names for each item on the scale. 24 Part A and Part B were later matched using nondescript codes on the front page of each part. 
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client profile, and other issues related to their decision.  Participants then completed the 
Mason and Levy (2001) advocacy scale specific to their second client scenario.  At the 
end of Part B, participants were asked to answer demographic questions, including years 
of experience as a tax professional, type of firm, title, CPA/non-CPA, gender, type of 
degree, and age. 
 
2.6 Results 
 
 The hypotheses are tested using a 2 x 3 ANOVA (IRS oversight risk by practice 
risk) with recommendation as the primary dependent variable for H1a, H1b, and H3a and 
advocacy as the primary dependent variable for H2a, H2b, and H3b.   
 
Ambiguous Decision Making – IRS Oversight 
 H1a predicts that, as IRS oversight increases, tax professionals will make less 
aggressive (client favorable) recommendations in accord with the expectations of 
deterrence theory.  Conversely, H1b predicts that, as IRS oversight increases, tax 
professionals will make more aggressive (client favorable) recommendations as they 
respond to increased IRS control.  Tax preparers reported their recommendation on a ten-
point, forced-decision scale, with 1 indicating “Definitely Hobby” and 10 indicating 
“Definitely Business”.  Mean recommendations by experimental condition are presented 
in Table 2, Panel A and support H1b, indicating a significant positive relationship 
between increased IRS oversight and increases in aggressive decision making (overall 
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mean of 6.04 when IRS oversight is high and overall mean of 5.21 when IRS oversight is 
low).  The ANOVA results for the model are presented in Table 2, Panel B and are 
significant at conventional levels (F = 13.79, p < 0.001).  Overall, these results suggest 
that tax professionals are likely to make a more aggressive reporting recommendation 
when IRS oversight is high, suggesting a negative response to increased controls by the 
IRS.  Additional analysis presented in Table 2, Panel C suggests that tax professionals are 
more aggressive when IRS oversight is high for both moderate and high practice risk 
clients, but insignificant when practice risk is low.  These results are further analyzed in 
the additional analysis section, which examines the effects of the interaction of IRS 
oversight and client practice risk.   
 
 [Insert Table 2] 
 
 The results for the current IRS oversight program, in this experimental setting, are 
contradictory to the tenets of deterrence theory upon which the IRS relies, but consistent 
with expectations from studies on control theory and prior tax research, which indicate a 
desire to challenge the IRS (Roberts 1998; Cuccia 1994b) or a building-up of a 
negotiating position with the IRS (Slemrod 2007). This implies that increased IRS 
oversight may be counterproductive to attempts to deter aggressive behavior because, as 
tax professionals respond to increased scrutiny and more intrusive controls by the IRS, 
trust and cooperation between the parties may be negatively affected. 
 
 63 
 
Advocacy – IRS Oversight 
 
 [Insert Table 3] 
 
 H2a posits that, as IRS oversight increases, tax professionals will report lower 
client advocacy intentions, while H2b posits that, as IRS oversight increases, tax 
professionals will report higher client advocacy intentions, demonstrating an increased 
“us versus them” mentality in response to increased IRS control.  Using the Mason and 
Levy (2001) advocacy scale, each participant responded to nine questions using a seven 
point Likert-type scale on each question, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree.  The results, presented in Table 3, support H2b, indicating that tax professionals 
increase their reported advocacy levels when presented with high IRS oversight (mean = 
43.60) versus low IRS oversight (mean = 39.79, F = 7.80, p = 0.006).  This finding 
supports the notion that advocacy is affected by external factors beyond client 
characteristics.  Further, the results demonstrate a positive relationship between increases 
in advocacy measures and increases in aggressive decision-making, supporting prior 
findings that advocacy intentions directly relate to the decision-making processes.  
Overall, the results on advocacy support and provide motivation for the results of 
hypothesis one, wherein tax professionals respond unfavorably to increased IRS control 
and make more aggressive recommendations in the presence of high IRS oversight.   
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Ambiguous Decision Making – Practice Risk 
  
 H3a predicts that, as practice risk increases, tax professionals will be less likely to 
recommend the client-preferred tax position.  Using a ten-point, forced-decision scale, tax 
professionals reported their recommendations at each of three manipulated levels of 
practice risk (low/moderate/high). The ANOVA results for practice risk are presented in 
Table 2, Panel B and are significant at conventional levels (F = 29.80, p < 0.001).  Mean 
recommendations by experimental condition are presented in Table 2, Panel A and 
indicate that tax professionals decrease the aggressiveness of their recommendations as 
practice risk increases.  For example, at the low IRS oversight level, tax professionals 
recommend business treatment (mean = 7.21) for a low practice taxpayer, but decrease 
their recommendation when faced with the moderate practice risk taxpayer (mean = 5.42) 
and recommend hobby treatment for the high practice risk taxpayer (mean = 2.91).   
 Kadous et al. (2008) find that practice risk impacts information search; however, 
contrary to hypothesized expectations, the authors find that practice risk does not alter 
final recommendations.25  Additional analysis presented in Table 2, Panel D supports the 
hypothesis that practice risk impacts a tax professional’s final recommendations.  
Specifically, at the low IRS oversight level, there is a statistically significant difference in 
recommendations between low and moderate practice risk (cells 1 versus 2 in Table 2, 
Panel A) and between moderate and high practice risk (cells 2 versus 3 in Table 2, Panel 
A), with tax professionals becoming significantly less aggressive moving from low to                                                         25 The authors find that tax professionals recommend away from the client-preferred treatment for both low 
and high practice risk. 
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moderate to high practice risk.26  The results suggest that tax professionals recommend 
toward the more aggressive (client favorable) position for both low and moderate practice 
risk clients, which accounts for a significant proportion of the client population (64.20 
percent + 31.33 percent).27  Thus, in the low oversight condition, it appears that practice 
risk may only be an effective deterrent against aggressive decision making for high 
practice risk clients, which only accounts for a small population of taxpayers (6.04 
percent).28   
 Additional analysis presented in Table 2, Panel D suggests that litigation has a 
significant impact on tax professionals.  I am able to parse out the effects of 
unsuccessfully defended positions during prior IRS audits (moderate practice risk profile) 
from a history of litigation (high practice risk profile).  By introducing a history of 
litigation only in the high practice risk profile, I demonstrate a strong negative reaction 
by tax professionals to taxpayer litigation.  Specifically, at the low IRS oversight level, 
there is a statistically significant difference (p-value < .001) in recommendations between 
moderate and high practice risk clients (cells 2 versus 3 in Table 2, Panel A).  While tax 
professionals are generally only liable for penalties and interest related to unsuccessful 
defended positions during IRS audits, litigation between a taxpayer and tax professional                                                         
26 Kadous et al. (2008) manipulated practice risk, but did not manipulate the external regulatory 
environment.  Therefore, I compare the results of their study to those of the low IRS oversight conditions. 
27 144 tax professionals rated the perceived risk level of the low/moderate/high practice risk taxpayer 
profiles as 1.93/4.94/5.82 on a scale ranging from lowest (1) to highest (7) risk.  They also noted the 
percent of similar clients of the low/moderate/high practice risk profiles as 64.20 percent/31.33 
percent/6.04 percent on a 100 percent scale. 28 As a manipulation check, I asked participants in this study to rate the riskiness of their given practice 
risk profile.  The participants viewed the high practice risk scenario similar to participants in Kadous et al. 
(2008) given that participants in Kadous et al. (2008) rated the riskiness of the practice risk profile at 5.87 
and the participants rated it at 5.82 on the same scale with values ranging from lowest (1) to highest (7) 
risk. 
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could represent a significant financial burden for tax professionals.  The results 
demonstrate an intense reaction to the potential for litigation from a taxpayer and suggest 
that a history of litigation should be used on a very limited basis in future research due to 
the limited generalizability of any results.  
 Overall, the results suggest that practice risk impacts tax professionals’ final 
recommendations, however, tax professionals only recommend strongly away from the 
client preferred position when facing high practice risk taxpayers.  Given the results 
suggesting high practice risk clients represent only six percent of the client population, 
future research could examine whether expanded definitions of low and moderate 
practice risk deter confirmation bias and whether additional levels of practice risk impact 
other factors such as tax fees and client retention.    
 
Advocacy – Practice Risk 
 
 H3b examines the prior finding that advocacy decreases as practice risk increases.  
I capture additional sensitivity to three levels of practice risk, finding evidence that 
varying levels of practice risk change reported advocacy levels (F = 21.22, p < 0.001).  
Similarly to Bobek et al. (2010), I find a significant difference between the moderate 
practice risk client (mean = 44.56) and high practice risk client (mean = 35.39).  
However, comparing the advocacy intentions toward the low practice risk client (mean = 
44.64) and the moderate practice risk client (mean = 44.56), there is evidence to support a 
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fairly substantial advocacy attitude, prevalent toward the majority of taxpayers.29  
Overall, the results suggest that tax professionals demonstrate a strong commitment to 
their professional role as client advocate for most tax clients. 
 
Additional Analysis - Interaction of IRS Oversight and Practice Risk 
 
 Given that a tax professional considers both the regulatory environment and client 
characteristics in developing their final recommendations, I examine the possible 
interactive effects of IRS oversight and practice risk.  The ANOVA results for the 
interaction between IRS oversight and practice risk are presented in Table 2, Panel B and 
are marginally significant at conventional levels (F = 2.50, p = 0.086).  Figure 2 diagrams 
the disordinal interaction and illustrates that tax professionals are only willing to increase 
their levels of aggressiveness, in the presence of high IRS oversight, for moderate and 
high practice risk clients.  Specifically, additional analysis presented in Table 2, Panel C 
suggests that the presence of high IRS oversight causes tax professionals to provide more 
aggressive recommendations for both moderate (cells 2 versus 5 in Table 2, Panel A) and 
high practice risk clients (cells 3 versus 6 in Table 2, Panel A).  While, for low practice 
risk clients, high IRS oversight has no significant impact on a tax professional’s 
recommendations (cells 1 versus 4 in Table 2, Panel A).30   
                                                        29 144 tax professionals rated the percent of their clients that are similar to the low/moderate/high practice risk profiles as 64.20 percent/31.33 percent/6.04 percent on a 100 percent scale.   30 This result is consistent with those of Cloyd and Spilker (1999).  In that study, the authors manipulated 
the probability of IRS audit between subjects and found that the probability of audit had no significant 
effect on any of the dependent measures, including strength of recommendation.   
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      [Insert Figure 2] 
   While these results suggest a counterintuitive outcome (i.e., that tax professionals 
are willing to fight for aggressive client positions for moderate and high practice risk 
clients, but not for low practice risk clients, when faced with high IRS scrutiny), 
anecdotal evidence from discussions with tax professionals and additional analysis of the 
results suggest that these results may be driven by tax professionals believing that 
moderate and high practice risk clients have a higher risk tolerance and thus are more 
willing to take an aggressive tax position in the presence of high IRS oversight.  
Specifically, tax professionals report the perceived client risk tolerance for the low, 
moderate, and high practice risk profiles as 3.84, 5.63, and 6.49, respectively, and the 
measures for client practice risk and perceived client risk tolerance are correlated at 0.703 
(p = 0.01), supporting anecdotal evidence that the practice risk construct may be partially 
interpreted as a client’s risk tolerance.31 32  In sum, the results suggest that a tax 
professional’s desire to be more aggressive, as a reaction to increased control, appears to 
be tempered by the perceived willingness of a taxpayer to take an aggressive position.  
Future research should determine the specific attributes of moderate and high practice 
risk clients that may be causing tax professionals to view these clients as having a higher 
                                                        
31 Each participant was asked to rate the client’s perceived risk tolerance of their given client practice risk 
profile on a seven-point scale, with 1 indicating “Client is risk averse (not willing to take risks)” and 7 
indicating “Client is risk seeking (willing to take significant risks)”.  Each tax professional received and 
responded to only one client practice risk profile.   32 The intervals between each of these ratings were significant at p < 0.001 
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risk tolerance and, thus, more willing to be aggressive in the presence of high IRS 
oversight.     
Additional Analysis - Non-ambiguous Decision Making 
  
 As a baseline control measure to validate the robustness of the results, I also 
examine a non-ambiguous decision-making scenario using a separate 2 x 3 ANOVA (IRS 
oversight risk by practice risk) with recommendation as the primary dependent variable.  
For the non-ambiguous decision scenario, tax professionals reported their business use 
recommendation on a one hundred percentage point scale, with 0 percent indicating no 
allowable business use deduction and 100 percent indicating a fully deductible business 
use deduction.  Given the objective nature of the non-ambiguous decision, I expect to 
find no difference in decisions between low and high IRS oversight.  Table 4 presents the 
results of the analysis.   
 
 [Insert Table 4] 
 
 Consistent with expectations, I find that increasing the level of IRS oversight has 
no significant impact on recommendations (p = 0.222) for the non-ambiguous decision.  
In further analysis, the only significant difference occurs in the analysis of simple effects 
between low and high IRS oversight for the low practice risk client.  Specifically, tax 
professionals make a significantly more conservative recommendation for the low 
practice risk client when IRS oversight is high (mean = 91.54) than when IRS oversight 
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is low (mean = 97.92, p = 0.014).  These results support the previous discussion, 
indicating increased sensitivity to the perceived risk tolerance of the client, wherein tax 
professionals adjust the mean recommendation for the more risk averse client (low 
practice risk) in the face of high IRS oversight, but remain constant or more aggressive in 
their decisions for higher perceived risk tolerance clients (moderate and high practice 
risk).   
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The IRS has recently increased the scrutiny of tax professionals through the 
implementation of new direct oversight provisions, which include visits to tax preparer 
offices to review client files and to quiz tax preparers on the Internal Revenue Code.  
These recent provisions have focused on increasing the certainty of detection of 
aggressive tax reporting, which engages the third and final prong of deterrence theory.  
Although deterrence theory suggests that the certainty of detection is the most important 
factor in increasing compliance, extant literature on control theory suggests that 
increasing controls often has the unintended effect of causing an increase in the 
aggressive behaviors the controls aim to constrain.  In addition to examining competing 
theories underlying tax preparer recommendations and client advocacy in the presence of 
these direct oversight initiatives, this paper also extends prior research on advocacy 
(Bobek et al. 2010; Mason and Levy 2001) and practice risk (Kadous et al. 2008; Kadous 
and Magro 2001). 
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 I find evidence, consistent with the expectations of extant literature on control 
theory, that tax professionals increase the aggressiveness of their recommendations and 
report higher advocacy intentions when presented with high direct IRS oversight.  These 
results are consistent with a tax practitioner’s desire to challenge the IRS (Roberts 1998; 
Cuccia 1994b) and support the notion that the current IRS oversight program may not 
work as intended on the professional tax community.  Additionally, the results suggest 
that client practice risk impacts tax professionals’ final recommendations.  Specifically, 
at low IRS oversight levels, tax professionals become significantly less aggressive 
moving from low to moderate to high practice risk.  In sum, the interaction results 
suggest that, as tax professionals respond negatively to increased IRS scrutiny, the 
aggressiveness of their final recommendation appears to be tempered in some part by the 
client’s perceived risk tolerance.   This study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, I am the first to 
examine whether increased monitoring, under the IRS’ new oversight initiatives, is useful 
in increasing tax compliance.  Second, I extend prior research on advocacy, with results 
indicating a strong adherence to the professional standard of advocacy on the part of tax 
professionals, which stands in direct conflict with IRS attempts to use tax preparers as 
agents of taxpayer enforcement.  Third, I provide expanded levels of practice risk, which 
provide evidence of the impact of specific client risk characteristics and should be 
beneficial to future research in this area.  Finally, I find that the practice risk construct 
may be partially interpreted as a proxy for a client’s risk tolerance, which may have a 
significant impact on the final recommendations of tax professionals. 
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 This study is subject to certain limitations.  First, this study suggests that client 
practice risk profiles may be partially interpreted as client risk tolerance perceptions but I 
did not examine these constructs separately.   Future research could separately examine 
client practice risk and client risk tolerance perceptions to determine which has a greater 
influence in the decision-making process.  Second, this study does not determine whether 
a tax professional’s aggressive decision-making is a conscious or unconscious process.  
Future research could examine whether the decisions of tax professionals are consciously 
thought out and purposeful or whether tax professionals are unconsciously biased in their 
decision-making processes.  This distinction would be particularly useful for practice 
management and future regulation as the profession attempts to limit penalties, sanctions, 
and litigation for overly aggressive tax reporting recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 3: ESSAY THREE 
Tax Professionals and Antecedents to Aggressive Decision 
Making: An Examination of Client Identification and Economic 
Importance 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
 Prior research has found that tax professionals make aggressive recommendations 
for their clients, even under the threat of increased penalties and other costs.  Thus, it is 
important to further understand why tax professionals may be willing to risk exposure to 
the increased costs of making aggressive recommendations for their clients.  This paper 
examines the impact of two antecedents to aggressive decision-making, namely the role 
of the interpersonal relationship with the client (client identification) and the economic 
importance of the client, on the recommendations of tax professionals.  Consistent with 
the tenets of Social Identity Theory, I find that stronger client identification leads to more 
aggressive recommendations and suggest that client identification is an important 
construct for future research in this area.  Further, I find that a client’s economic 
importance does not follow the presumed linear positive relationship with more 
aggressive recommendations.  Rather the results suggest a nonlinear relationship between 
economic importance and aggressive recommendations, demonstrating a complex and 
multi-faceted response to economic importance. 
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3.2 Introduction 
 
 Prior research (Cuccia 1994; Roberts 1998; Cloyd and Spilker 1999; Hansen and 
White 2012; Vermeer 2012) has found that professional tax preparers make aggressive 
tax recommendations to their clients.  While tax professionals are expected to be 
advocates for their clients (AICPA 2009), recommending aggressive tax positions poses a 
serious, and potentially costly, problem for the profession.  Specifically, tax professionals 
and their firms face considerable exposure to professional sanctions and penalties as the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) works to tighten its monitoring of the tax profession 
through increased penalties, higher standards of care, and a new preparer oversight 
program.  Additionally, tax professionals are exposed to the possibility of costly litigation 
and damage to their professional reputation when making aggressive tax 
recommendations.  As the tax profession moves forward, it is important to further 
understand why tax professionals may be willing to risk exposure to these types of costs 
for their tax clients.  Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine the antecedents to 
aggressive decision making, specifically client identification and economic importance, 
and how these factors influence the decision making of tax professionals. 
 Drawing on the theory of economic dependence, prior tax literature presumes that 
client importance, conceptualized as the current and future income streams associated 
with a particular client, is the primary antecedent to aggressive tax decisions (Bobek, 
Hageman, and Hatfield 2010); however, studies examining client (economic) importance 
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in the tax setting have found conflicting results.1  Social Identity Theory (SIT), as well as 
interviews with practicing tax professionals2, suggests that, in addition to economic 
importance, the strength of the interpersonal relationship with the client (client 
identification) is a prominent indicator of client importance.  Social Identity Theory 
suggests that, as tax professionals develop strong interpersonal relationships (client 
identification) with their tax clients, the relationship may provide personal incentives 
which can compel aggressive (client favorable) tax reporting.  Prior audit research 
supports this, finding that auditors who identify more with an audit client are more likely 
to acquiesce to a client-preferred position, demonstrate impaired objectivity, and 
contribute to perceived audit failures. (Nelson 2009; Bamber and Iyer 2007)  Contrary to 
audit, in the tax environment, the majority of individual tax clients are often perceived as 
economically insignificant.  Consequently, the construct of client identification may 
provide valuable insight into the incentives and aggressive decision making of tax 
professionals, beyond purely economic motivations.  To my knowledge, this construct 
has not been examined in prior tax literature. 
 Prior tax research has assumed a linear relationship between economic importance 
and aggressive tax reporting, finding conflicting results on client (economic) importance.3  
While the theory of economic dependence (DeAngelo 1981) suggests that tax 
                                                             1 McGill (1990); Reckers et al. (1991); Bandy et al. (1994); Bobek et al. (2010)  2 In interviews conducted with 23 tax professionals at a national tax conference in July 2011, tax 
professionals, independently and consistently, stated that the relationship with the client (both the instant 
ability to relate and the ongoing relationship were cited as equally important), the likability of the client, 
and the size of the fees earned from the client were reasons tax professionals would take aggressive 
positions for tax clients. 3 McGill (1990); Reckers et al. (1991); Bandy et al. (1994); Roberts (1998); Bobek et al. (2010)  
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accountants have direct economic incentives to make aggressive client-preferred 
recommendations when the client is important (Roberts 1998), the countervailing 
incentives (Nelson 2009) of larger penalties, reputation loss, litigation costs, and 
increased litigation potential, may make the perceived costs of making more aggressive 
decisions exceed the benefits.  Thus, as a client becomes more economically important, a 
non-linear relationship may develop as tax professionals reach a saturation point (i.e., 
where the risks of the countervailing incentives outweigh the rewards).  
 Using an experiment with practicing tax professionals, I manipulate client 
attributes at two levels (low/high) to stimulate client identification and manipulate 
economic importance (client fees) at three levels (low/moderate/high) in a full factorial 
design, measuring the effect on the main dependent variable of tax recommendations.  
Consistent with SIT, the results suggest that the strength of the client relationship (client 
identification) has a significant impact on the aggressiveness of recommendations at the 
low and moderate economic importance levels.  Further, as suggested by the theory of 
economic dependence, economic importance is a significant factor in aggressive tax 
reporting moving from the low economic to moderate economic importance levels.  
However, in the high economic importance condition, tax professionals appear to curtail 
their aggressiveness back to levels consistent with those at the low economic importance 
level, demonstrating a nonlinear response to economic importance.  Post experimental 
questions suggest that countervailing incentives, such as reputation protection and risk of 
economic loss, appear to overshadow both a client’s economic importance and the effects 
of client identification at the high economic importance level. 
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 The implications of the results are twofold: First, consistent with SIT, I introduce 
the construct of client identification in the tax environment and examine its importance as 
an antecedent motivation to a tax professional’s aggressive decision making.  Second, I 
extend the research on economic importance, finding that the antecedent motivator of 
economic importance is a complex multi-faceted issue and may not be the linear 
relationship presumed in prior research.  Thus, the results on both client identification 
and economic importance may provide rationalization for the conflicting results on client 
importance in prior studies and should be fruitful for future accounting research. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section II develops theory and 
hypotheses, Section III describes the research method, Section IV presents the results, 
and Section V concludes the paper.  
 
3.3 Theory and Hypothesis Development 
 
 Tax accountants are expected to accept greater risks for aggressive reporting 
when the expected rewards of benefitting an important client are greater (Roberts 1998).  
While prior tax research has primarily defined client importance as the current and future 
income streams associated with a particular client (i.e., economic importance), Reid and 
Deaux (1996) suggest that tax professionals find intrinsic personal value and meaning by 
fulfilling their occupational roles.  Further, SIT suggests that, as tax professionals 
develop stronger interpersonal relationships with their tax clients, the relationship may 
provide additional personal incentives which can compel aggressive tax reporting.  In 
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fact, interviews with practicing tax professionals suggest that the strength of the 
interpersonal relationship, as well as economic importance, are the two main facets of 
client importance.  Thus, I manipulate and examine both client identification and 
economic importance in this study as main indicators of client importance and, thus, 
potentially strong antecedents to aggressive tax reporting. 
Client Identification 
 I first examine the construct of client identification, or the strength of the 
interpersonal relationship between taxpayer and tax professional, which, according to the 
tenets of SIT, may produce compelling incentives for aggressive (client favorable) tax 
reporting. Social Identity Theory posits that a person’s social identification is defined by 
their perceived membership in distinct real or imagined social groups, termed “ingroups”.  
An individual may have several ingroup identities, typically classified through the 
person’s vocation or organization (Turner 1978; Hogg and Terry 2000) or avocation 
(Underwood, Bond, and Baer 2001).  Research in the social sciences has shown that, as a 
result of social identity, people typically evaluate members of their ingroups more 
favorably (Tajfel 1970, Tajfel 1978; Turner 1978), often leading to an alteration of the 
person’s attitudes and behaviors which results in a favorable bias toward the perceived 
ingroup (Hogg and Terry 2000).  Further, Reid and Deaux (1996) suggest that individuals 
experience “role-based” self-images, such as those created through occupation, which are 
restricted to a limited set of cognitive structures and involve well-developed personal 
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interpretations of value, meaning, and performance styles that provide an overarching 
theme or integrity to personal identity.   
 Many elements of SIT are present in the relationship between tax preparer and tax 
client.  Tax professionals often engage personally with clients in the preparation of tax 
returns and the completion of tax planning services, sometimes forming close personal 
ties with their tax clients.  SIT suggests that these types of interpersonal relationships 
may create strong client identification, leading to favorable bias toward client preferred 
treatments, and may threaten a tax professional’s ability to evaluate evidence objectively.  
Thus, stronger client identification may lead to the recommendation of aggressive tax 
positions, posing a serious, and potentially costly, situation for the tax professional and 
their firm.   
 Tax professionals have an inherent “role” as client advocate (AICPA 2009) and, 
according to Reid and Deaux (1996), tax professionals find intrinsic personal value and 
meaning by fulfilling their occupational role.  Thus, in order to demonstrate their value 
and validate their personal identity, tax preparers may feel a need to consistently 
demonstrate their role as advocate, fighting with a strong bias toward client-favorable tax 
treatments when clients are perceived to have ingroup status (i.e., higher client 
identification).   
 Hence, according to the tenets of SIT, tax professionals will be more likely to 
recommend more aggressive client preferred tax positions for clients with whom they 
have stronger client identification, leading to the following hypothesis: 
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H1: As client identification increases, tax professionals will be more likely to 
recommend more aggressive (client-favorable) tax positions. 
 
Economic Importance 
 Drawing on the theory of economic dependence (DeAngelo 1981) and weighing 
the economic benefits and costs of an aggressive tax position (Roberts 1998, Figure 1), 
tax accountants have direct economic incentives to make recommendations consistent 
with client preference when the tax issue is ambiguous and the client is important 
(Roberts 1998).  Thus, tax accountants are expected to accept greater risks for aggressive 
reporting when the expected reward from benefitting an important client is higher 
(Johnson 1993; Cuccia 1994, 1995; Cuccia, Hackenbrack, and Nelson 1995; Roberts 
1998).  
 While prior tax literature presumes that client importance, conceptualized as the 
current and future income streams associated with a particular client, is associated with 
aggressive tax decisions (Bobek et al. 2010), prior studies examining client importance, 
as a purely economic incentive, have found conflicting results.4  Early tax research 
examined client importance using general terms of “major” versus “minor” client 
(McGill 1990) and client gross income amounts and extent of past referrals (Reckers, 
Sanders, and Wyndelts 1991), finding that relative client importance is significantly 
associated with tax reporting decisions.  Conversely, Bandy, Betancourt, and Kelliher 
                                                             4 The full definition of “client importance” in prior tax literature is “the current and future income streams 
associated with a particular client, either directly or through the influence on other clients”. (Bobek et al. 
2010) 
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(1994) isolate the impact of past referrals and find that the economic importance of a 
taxpayer has little or no effect on a tax professional’s advice or willingness to sign an 
aggressive tax return.  These early studies have received criticism for their 
operationalization of client importance (Roberts 1998).5  A subsequent study by Bobek et 
al. (2010) finds that client (economic) importance does not affect advocacy intentions or 
recommendations for client preferred favorable tax treatments.6 
 While prior tax studies report mixed results on client (economic) importance, 
there is continued concern and theoretical justification regarding the potential impact of a 
client’s economic importance on the decision making of tax and audit professionals.  
Further, the operationalization of client importance in the majority of these studies has 
received considerable criticism.  Thus, this study experimentally manipulates three levels 
of economic importance, consistent with discrete client fee revenues suggested by the 
audit literature (Lowe and Pany 1995; Beattie, Brandt, and Fearnley 1999), leading to the 
following hypothesis:   
H2a: As a client’s economic importance increases, tax professionals will be more 
likely to recommend more aggressive (client-favorable) tax positions. 
 
                                                             5 See full discussion in Roberts (1998).  Main criticisms include weak operationalization of importance 
between conditions, lack of ambiguity in the tax decision, lack of manipulation check to support results, 
confounds of client importance with client sophistication by varying occupation of taxpayers between 
treatments, etc. 6 Bobek et al. (2010) examine client importance and find that client importance does not affect client-
specific advocacy or recommendations, but that it does have some effect on the weighting of evidence and 
the allowance of a favorable tax treatment.   
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 While the theory of economic dependence suggests that, as clients become more 
economically important, audit professionals will cater to managements’ financial 
reporting demands (Keune and Johnstone 2012) and, similarly, that tax professionals will 
be more likely to recommend more aggressive (client-favorable) tax positions (Roberts 
1998; Bobek et al. 2010), research on countervailing incentives in audit (Nelson 2009) 
suggests there may be a limit to the effects of a client’s economic importance on the 
decision making of accounting professionals.  Specifically, as clients become more 
economically important, they also become larger and more visible.  Thus, there is greater 
saliency of the potential costs of making aggressive decisions, such as exposure to larger 
penalties and increased exposure to reputation loss, litigation costs, and the overall 
potential for litigation, which could create a switch point, or a change in economic utility, 
wherein the costs of making more aggressive (client-favorable) decisions might be 
perceived to exceed the benefits. 
 In the tax environment, as a client gets larger, there is a steep increase in the risk 
of IRS audit (Kiplinger 2013).7  Further, consistent with the countervailing incentive of 
reputation protection, Reynolds and Francis (2001) find that larger clients pose greater 
litigation risk causing Big 5 auditors to report more conservatively for more economically 
important clients.  While the fear of litigation risk is economically acute in the audit 
environment, litigation risk poses a more common threat in the tax environment as tax 
practice litigation claims presented by Continental Casualty Co. (CNA) generated nearly 
                                                             7 The IRS audit rates for individual taxpayers with income below $200,000 is less than one percent 
(0.94%); however, the audit rate for individual taxpayers making over $200,000 of income jumps to 3.70% 
(1 in 27 returns) and for individuals making income of $1 million or more, the audit rate is greater than 
12.5% (or greater than 1 in 8 returns). 
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60 percent of AICPA program claims for the period 1996-2001 (Anderson and Wolfe 
2002).8  Additionally, penalties for tax professionals under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 
Section 6694 are based on the income derived from the client (i.e., the fees received from 
the client).9  Thus, the larger the fee generated from the tax client, the greater the risk of 
substantial economic loss.  In sum, these countervailing incentives may create a 
disincentive for tax professionals to recommend aggressive tax positions to more 
economically important clients. 
 Prior tax literature has presumed a linear relationship between a client’s economic 
importance and aggressive tax reporting (Roberts 1998; Bobek et al. 2010).  To my 
knowledge, tax literature has not examined the potential for a nonlinear relationship 
between client importance and aggressive tax reporting.  Specifically, (as illustrated in 
Figure Three) at some point, the potential costs (countervailing effects) exceed the 
incentives of client (economic) importance, leading to a reduction in aggressive tax 
reporting.  Consistent with the foregoing discussion, as countervailing incentives create 
potential costs that may be perceived as exceeding the benefits of a client’s economic 
importance, a nonlinear relationship between client (economic) importance and a tax 
professional’s recommendation may develop, leading to the following hypothesis: 
                                                             8 CNA is the underwriter of the AICPA professional liability insurance program.  The breakout of claims 
data occurred for the period 1996-2001. 
9 Internal Revenue Code Section 6694 sets the preparer level penalties for underreported tax liabilities due 
to unreasonable tax positions or willful or reckless conduct. First-tier penalties (for unreasonable positions) 
were increased from $250 to the greater of $1000 or 50 percent of the income derived by the tax return 
preparer.  Second-tier penalties (for willful or reckless conduct) were increased from $1000 to the greater 
of $5000 or 50 percent of the income derived by the tax return preparer.  The “realistic possibility standard” 
required a one-in-three likelihood that the reported tax position would be sustained on its merits, while the 
increased “more likely than not standard” requires a better than 50 percent chance that the reported tax 
position will be sustained on its merits and the “substantial authority standard” has been interpreted as 
approximately 40 percent (Pauly 2008). 
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 H2b: At some level of economic importance, tax professionals will be less likely 
 to recommend more aggressive (client favorable) tax positions as a client’s 
 economic importance increases.  
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
3.4 Research Methodology 
 
  I examine the hypotheses using an experiment in which tax professionals are 
asked to make a recommendation on a hobby versus business tax decision (an ambiguous 
client fact scenario).  Both client identification (2 levels) and economic importance (3 
levels) are manipulated between participants within the experimental materials.   
Participants 
Participants are practicing tax professionals recruited at a national tax 
conference.10  This method of recruitment provides for a large sample of experienced tax 
professionals who regularly deal with and make decisions on individual taxpayer issues 
and who are unlikely to be biased by geographic location or any singular firm size, 
training, or practice philosophy.  I recruited 136 participants out of 237 in attendance 
(57.4% response rate) at the conference.  Of those, three participants failed manipulation 
checks or had incomplete data, resulting in 133 usable participant instruments. 
                                                             
10 Approval was granted for the use of human subjects in this experiment by the institution where this 
experiment was conducted. 
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As presented in Table 5, the experience level ranges from 6 months (0.5 years) to 
480 months (20 years), with a mean experience level of 85.20 months (7.10 years); 52.6 
percent were male; 48.1 percent possess an advanced degree; and 84.2 percent hold a 
current CPA license.  Participants are employed by national accounting firms (12.1 
percent), regional accounting firms (52.3 percent), and local accounting firms (35.6 
percent).11 
[Insert Table 5] 
Experimental Design 
The experiment employs a 2 x 3 full factorial design, manipulating two levels of 
client identification (low and high) and three levels of economic importance 
(low/moderate/high) between participants.   
 In this study, the low client identification condition is manipulated with the 
following statement: “You receive all your information about these clients through the 
partner on this engagement and, as such, you do not have personal contact with the 
taxpayers.” and the high client identification condition is manipulated with the following 
statement: “Joanne has been your pharmacist for the past seven years and when John and 
Joanne were selecting a new tax preparer, you brought them in as clients of your firm.  
As such, you meet individually with the taxpayers each year, serve as their primary point 
                                                             
11 There is not a significant difference in mean recommendations between firm types.  
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of contact with your firm, and you have established a friendly relationship with the 
clients.” 
   The three levels of economic importance (low/moderate/high) are defined 
consistent with prior audit research (Lowe and Pany 1995; Beattie et al. 1999).12  
Specifically, low economic importance is defined as a client with total fees of less than 
one percent (1%) and high economic importance is defined as a client with total fees of 
12 percent (12%) or greater.  I also include an intermediate value (moderate economic 
importance) of six percent (6%) to determine if there is variation between the low and 
high values.   
Experimental Procedures 
 Participants were provided with a research instrument containing brief directions 
and a basic client profile with the manipulations of client identification (low/high) 
crossed with the manipulations of economic importance (low/moderate/high) in a full 
factorial 2 x 3 experimental design.  Participants were then presented with basic 
information about the taxpayers13 and the pertinent facts about the taxpayers’ business 
versus hobby tax issue.14  In the tax case, the taxpayers would like to deduct $31,000 of 
expenses related to songwriting activities during the year; thus, they prefer that the 
songwriting activities be treated as a business so the related expenses can be deducted on 
                                                             12 Prior audit research defines an economically material client as a client with fees of ten percent (10%) or 
greater of office revenues (Beatty et al. 1999) or twelve percent (12%) or greater of office revenues (Lowe 
and Pany 1995) and an economically immaterial client as a client with fees of less than one percent (1%). 13 To ensure consistent interpretation of the client risk profile, I use a low practice risk profile consistent 
with that used in prior research (Kadous and Magro 2001; Vermeer 2012) 14 See Appendix A for an excerpt of the tax issue from the experimental materials 
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their tax return (hobby related expenses are not deductible).15  After reviewing the case, 
the participants were referred to appropriate regulatory support for making a decision 
(IRS regulations) and asked to make a business/hobby recommendation for the taxpayers.   
 Then, participants were asked to answer questions about the confidence of their 
decision, familiarity with the business/hobby decision, manipulation check questions, and 
other questions related to the decision and client profile.  Participants then completed the 
Mason and Levy (2001) advocacy scale specific to their client scenario16 and SIT scales 
(Mael and Ashforth 1992; Bhattacharya, Rao, and Glynn 1995; Russo 1998; Bamber and 
Iyer 2007) measuring client identification, professional identification, and firm 
identification.   
 Finally, participants were asked to answer demographic questions, including 
months of experience as a tax professional, type of firm, CPA/non-CPA, gender, type of 
degree, and age.  As an added validation measure, I asked respondents to answer 
multiple-choice questions, in a post-experimental survey, indicating the likelihood of 
success if the recommendation is challenged, familiarity with the current penalty and 
standards of care required of practicing tax professionals under IRC Section 6694, and 
questions supporting their decision process.  The post-experimental design is used to 
ensure that the participants are knowledgeable about the current regulatory standards 
                                                             15 Prior studies (Cloyd and Spilker 1999) have found that client preference induces bias.  I hold client preference constant across all manipulations to isolate the effects of the manipulated variable from the effects of client preference induced bias. 16 Consistent with the concept of client-specific advocacy introduced by Bobek et al. (2010), the Mason 
and Levy (2001) advocacy scale was administered by replacing the general term “taxpayer” with the 
hypothetical client names for each item on the scale. 
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applicable to their decisions and to obtain information supporting their decision factors, 
but to avoid biasing their answers within the experimental materials. 
Independent Variables, Covariates, and Dependent Variable 
 There were two independent variables manipulated between participants: client 
identification (low and high) and economic importance (low/moderate/high).  The 
manipulation checks for these variables are described below.  Participants’ gender and 
familiarity with the decision are included as covariates. 
 Gender and decision familiarity are included in the ANCOVA model because 
they have been found to have an impact on decision-making in prior research (McGill 
1990; Reckers et al. 1991; Roberts 1998; Hansen and White 2012) and are significant 
variables in the model.  Although these covariates contribute to the overall power of the 
model, their inclusion does not substantially alter the main effects of the study (ANOVA 
model without gender and decision familiarity as covariates, F = 3.371, p = 0.007).  The 
mean recommendation for males is 7.16 while the mean recommendation for females is 
5.54 (t = 3.981, p < 0.001).  This result on gender is consistent with prior research 
indicating that males are less risk averse than females (McGill 1990; Hansen and White 
2012).  The mean for decision familiarity (decision experience) is 3.42 on a scale of 1 to 
7, with 1 indicating “never” and 7 indicating “frequent” participation, with 86.6 percent 
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of the participants indicating they participate in business/hobby decisions for current tax 
clients.17  Thus, participants are well suited for the experimental task. 
 There was one primary dependent variable: (1) the recommendation of the tax 
position.  Additional dependent variables are considered in the manipulation checks and 
additional analysis sections. 
Manipulation Checks 
 The effectiveness of the client identification manipulation was assessed via 
participants’ responses to a five-item client identification scale, adapted from Bamber and 
Iyer (2007) and Bhattacharya et al. (1995).  The five-item client identification scale18 
captures the degree of identification with the client, consistent with SIT.  The total client 
identification score was computed by summing up the responses to the five-item scale, 
with a total client identification score ranging between 5 and 25.  The mean (standard 
deviation) for the total client identification score is 13.33 (4.32) in the low client 
identification condition, compared with 16.85 (4.83) in the high client identification 
condition.  The difference in means is significant between the low and high client 
identification conditions (F = 18.97; p < 0.001), indicating a successful manipulation of 
client identification. 
 To examine the effectiveness of the economic importance manipulations, I asked 
participants to indicate whether the client represented an economically important client 
                                                             17 Task specific familiarity has been found to be a significant measure impacting differences in judgment 
and decision-making (Reckers et al. 1991; Roberts 1998). 18 The five-item client identification scale is presented in Appendix B. 
 90 
on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating “not economically important” and 7 indicating 
“extremely economically important”.  The mean (standard deviation) responses are 2.11 
(1.30) for the low economic importance condition, 4.40 (1.72) for the moderate economic 
importance condition, and 5.29 (1.56) for the high economic importance condition.  
Overall, these differences in means are statistically significant (F = 51.63, p < 0.001) and 
t-test results indicate significant differences between the low and moderate economic 
condition (t = 7.16, p < 0.001), significant differences between the moderate and high 
economic condition (t = 2.70, p = 0.024), and significant differences between the low and 
high economic condition (t = 9.73, p < 0.001).  In sum, these results indicate a successful 
manipulation of economic importance.     
 To ensure that the business versus hobby tax case in my experimental materials 
involved an ambiguous decision scenario and that choosing business treatment is 
considered an aggressive tax position, I asked participants to respond to a post-
experimental question about the likelihood that business treatment of the tax issue would 
be sustained on its merits.  Participants responded on a scale, indicating zero percent (not 
likely at all to be sustained) to one hundred percent (extremely likely to be sustained).  
The mean (standard deviation) response to the likelihood that business treatment would 
be sustained on its merits is 24.47 (15.42), with a minimum rating of zero and a 
maximum rating of seventy.  This response indicates that making a recommendation for 
business treatment is an aggressive decision for the experimental tax case.19  Further, 
                                                             19 To ensure that participants understood the professional standards and penalties currently in place 
regarding aggressive decision making, I asked two post-experimental multiple choice questions asking 
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35.8% of the participants recommended hobby treatment in the study while 64.2% 
recommended business treatment in the study.  These responses demonstrate a sufficient 
level of ambiguity in the decision process. 
 
3.5 Results 
 
 Hypotheses are tested using a 2 x 3 ANCOVA (client identification by economic 
importance) with recommendation as the primary dependent variable.  In this study, tax 
professionals report their recommendations on a ten-point, forced decision scale, with 1 
indicating “Definitely Hobby” and 10 indicating “Definitely Business”.  The ANCOVA 
results for the model are presented in Table 6, Panel B and are significant at conventional 
levels (F = 7.09, p < 0.001).   
Client Identification 
 Consistent with the expectations of SIT, H1 predicts that tax professionals will be 
more likely to recommend more aggressive (client-favorable) tax positions as client 
identification increases.   Mean recommendations by experimental condition are 
presented in Table 6, Panel A and support H1, indicating a significant positive 
relationship between increased client identification and more aggressive (client-
favorable) recommendations (overall mean of 6.93 in the high client identification 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
participants to identify (1) the current professional standard applicable to this decision and (2) the current 
penalties in place under IRC Section 6694.  Respondents successfully indicated the correct penalty (91.7 
percent) and the correct standard(s) (94 percent), indicating an overall familiarity with the standards and 
penalties applicable to the business/hobby recommendation. 
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condition and overall mean of 5.85 in the low client identification condition; F = 8.14, p 
= 0.005).  Overall, consistent with the expectations of SIT and anecdotal evidence from 
the profession, these results suggest that tax professionals are more likely to make more 
aggressive recommendations for clients with whom they feel stronger client 
identification.   
[Insert Table 6] 
 High client identification appears to have the greatest impact when a client’s 
economic significance is low (mean recommendation of 6.83 for high client identification 
condition and 5.05 for low client identification condition; F = 4.08, p = 0.049) or 
moderate (mean recommendation of 7.82 for high client identification condition and 6.57 
for low client identification condition; F = 4.90, p = 0.032).  Conversely, high client 
identification does not substantially alter the recommendation for clients with high 
economic significance (mean recommendation of 6.10 for high client identification 
condition and 5.90 for low client identification condition; F = 0.085, p = 0.772).  In 
advance of the discussion of economic importance below, this result suggests that the 
effects of high client identification reach a saturation point, where the effects of client 
identification seem to recede and tax professionals curtail their aggressiveness back to a 
level similar to the low client identification condition.  I will discuss these results in 
further detail in the economic importance and supplementary analysis sections below.  
Overall, the construct of client identification appears to be an important antecedent of 
aggressive decision making in the tax environment, which exists independent of a client’s 
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economic importance, and is especially salient at the low and moderate economic 
importance levels. 
Economic Importance 
 Consistent with the theory of economic dependence and prior tax literature, H2a 
predicts that tax professionals will make more aggressive (client-favorable) 
recommendations as a client’s economic importance increases (a linear positive 
relationship).  Contrary to the linear relationship hypothesized in H2a, H2b predicts that, 
at some level of economic importance, tax professionals will make less aggressive 
(client-favorable) recommendations as economic importance increases.  In other words, 
the positive relationship between a client’s economic importance and a tax professional’s 
increase in aggressive recommendations may not continue in perpetuity.  Instead, the 
countervailing incentives of reputation protection and the risk of economic loss from 
penalties and litigation may, at some point, create a disincentive that overshadows the 
client’s economic importance, creating a nonlinear relationship between economic 
importance and aggressive decision making.   
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
 Figure 4 diagrams the mean recommendation by treatment condition and suggests 
that these results provide partial support for H2a, namely that tax professionals make 
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more aggressive (client-favorable) recommendations as a client’s economic importance 
increases.  As presented in Table 6, Panel C, there is a statistically significant positive 
difference (t = 3.10, p = 0.002) between the recommendations for the low and moderate 
economic conditions, with a mean (standard deviation) recommendation for the low 
economic importance condition of 5.98 (3.01) and a mean recommendation of 7.18 (1.98) 
for the moderate economic importance condition.  Overall, as suggested by the theory of 
economic dependence, tax professionals do react, at least partially, to a client’s economic 
importance. 
 Although the results provide partial support for H2a, the results fully support H2b, 
namely that, at some level of economic importance, tax professionals will make less 
aggressive (client-favorable) recommendations as a client’s economic importance 
increases.  Specifically, as diagrammed in Figure 4, the effects of economic importance 
seem to recede at the high economic importance level as tax professionals curtail their 
aggressiveness back to levels consistent with those of the low economic importance level.  
As presented in Table 6, Panel C, there is a statistically significant negative difference (t 
= 3.01, p = 0.003) between the recommendations for the moderate and high economic 
conditions, with a mean (standard deviation) recommendation for the medium economic 
importance condition of 7.18 (1.98) and a mean recommendation of 6.00 (2.09) for the 
high economic importance condition.  In fact, the mean recommendation of 6.00 for the 
high economic condition is not statistically different (t = 0.02, p = 0.984) than the mean 
recommendation of 5.98 for the low economic importance condition.  In sum, these 
results support H2b, indicating a nonlinear response to economic importance, with tax 
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professionals becoming less aggressive as the countervailing incentives of reputation 
protection and risk of economic loss overshadow a client’s economic importance.   
 To further examine the impact of countervailing economic incentives on tax 
professional decision making at each level of economic importance, participants were 
asked (in a post-experimental questionnaire) to respond to three scales indicating how 
important the following three issues were in making their recommendation decision: (1) 
risk of economic loss from penalties and litigation, (2) risk of loss of professional 
reputation, and (3) maintaining the relationship with the client.20  Participants responded 
to each question on a seven point Likert scale, with 1 indicating “not important” and 7 
indicating “extremely important”.  For the (1) risk of economic loss question, there is a 
statistically significant difference (p < 0.001) between the [mean (standard deviation)] 
responses for the moderate economic importance condition [3.84 (1.18)] and the high 
economic importance condition [5.57 (1.17)].21  This result indicates greater saliency of 
the increased risk of economic loss in the high economic importance condition, 
supporting the decrease in aggressive recommendations found in my study at the highest 
level of economic importance.  The results on the (2) risk of loss of professional 
reputation question are similar, with a statistically significant difference (p < 0.001) 
between the [mean (standard deviation)] responses for the moderate economic 
importance condition [4.09 (1.14)] and the high economic importance condition [5.76 
                                                             20 The overall mean (standard deviation) for the third question (maintaining relationship with the client) is 
4.38 (1.13) and the means between each condition are not significantly different at p < 0.05. 21 The means for the low economic importance condition are not significantly different from the moderate 
economic importance condition. 
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(1.16)].22  Thus, suggesting an increase in perceived exposure to loss of professional 
reputation.  Overall, these results provide additional support for a potential shift in 
decision making and corollary decrease in aggressive recommendations found in the high 
economic importance conditions.  Future research could examine at what point this shift 
in decision making occurs and isolate which countervailing incentives, solely or in 
tandem, may be the most important factors in the tax environment. 
Supplemental Analysis 
 Advocacy “is a state of mind in which one feels one’s primary loyalty belongs to 
the taxpayer.  It is exhibited by a desire to represent the taxpayer zealously within the 
bounds of the law, and by a desire to be a fighter on behalf of the taxpayer” (Mason and 
Levy 2001).  Building on a significant amount of research linking client advocacy to 
professional recommendations and judgments [Mason and Levy 2001; Bobek et al. 2010 
(literature review of advocacy studies); Hansen and White 2012], I measure participant 
responses to the Mason and Levy (2001) advocacy scale, using the construct of client-
specific advocacy introduced by Bobek et al. (2010).23 
 Overall, I find that advocacy is not correlated with economic importance (F = 
0.210, p = 0.811).  This result is consistent with the finding in Bobek et al. (2010) that 
higher client importance, defined in purely economic terms, does not affect advocacy 
                                                             22 The means for the low economic importance condition are not significantly different from the moderate 
economic importance condition. 23 Consistent with the concept of client-specific advocacy introduced by Bobek et al. (2010), the Mason 
and Levy (2001) advocacy scale was administered by replacing the general term “taxpayer” with the 
hypothetical client names for each item on the scale. 
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intentions.  Conversely, my results do indicate a significant positive relationship between 
increased client identification and increased advocacy scores (overall mean of 45.22 in 
the high client identification condition and overall mean of 42.88 in the low client 
identification condition; F = 4.22, p = 0.042).24  Thus, client identification does appear to 
significantly impact client advocacy and may be an important determinant of overall 
client importance. 
 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
While tax professionals are expected to be advocates for their clients (AICPA 
2009), recommending aggressive tax positions poses a serious, and potentially costly, 
problem for the profession.  Although the risk of litigation is economically acute in the 
audit environment, litigation risk poses a more common threat in the tax environment as 
tax practice litigation claims generated nearly 60 percent of the AICPA program 
insurance claims for the period 1996-2001 (Anderson and Wolfe 2002).  Additionally, 
penalties for tax professionals under IRC Section 6694 are based on the income derived 
from the client (i.e., the fees received from the client).  Moving forward, it is important to 
further understand why tax professionals may be willing to risk exposure to these types of 
costs for their tax clients.  Thus, this paper examines the impact of two antecedents to 
aggressive decision-making, namely the role of the interpersonal relationship with the 
                                                             24 The client specific advocacy scores for my participants ranged from 24 (low advocacy) to 60 (high 
advocacy), with a mean score of 42.88 for the low client identification condition.  This compares to means 
of 42.20 in the Mason and Levy (2001) study, 42.43 in the Bobek et al. (2010) study, and 43.20 in the 
Hansen and White (2012) study. 
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client (client identification) and the economic importance of the client, on the 
recommendations of tax professionals. 
 Using an experiment with practicing tax professionals at a national tax 
conference, I manipulate client attributes at two levels (low/high) to stimulate client 
identification and manipulate economic importance (client fees) at three levels 
(low/moderate/high) in a full factorial design, measuring the effect on the main 
dependent variable of tax recommendations.  Consistent with SIT, the results suggest that 
the strength of the client relationship (client identification) has a significant impact on the 
aggressiveness of recommendations at the low and moderate economic importance levels.  
Further, as suggested by the theory of economic dependence, economic importance is a 
significant factor in aggressive tax reporting moving from the low economic to moderate 
economic importance levels.  However, in the high economic importance condition, tax 
professionals make less aggressive recommendations, back to levels consistent with those 
at the low economic importance level, demonstrating a nonlinear response to economic 
importance.  Post experimental questions suggest that countervailing incentives, such as 
reputation protection and risk of economic loss, appear to overshadow both a client’s 
economic importance and the effects of client identification at the high economic 
importance level. 
 The implications of these results are twofold: First, consistent with SIT, I 
introduce the construct of client identification in the tax environment and examine its 
importance as an antecedent motivation to a tax professional’s aggressive decision 
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making.  Second, I extend the research on economic importance, finding that the 
antecedent motivator of economic importance is a complex multi-faceted issue and may 
not be the linear relationship presumed in prior research.  Thus, the results on both client 
identification and economic importance may provide rationalization for the conflicting 
results on client importance in prior studies and should be fruitful for future accounting 
research.  Specifically, future research should examine at what point tax professionals 
“switch” and make less aggressive (client-favorable) recommendations as economic 
importance increases and which potential costs, such as reputation protection or the risk 
of economic loss, may be the prevailing reason for the switch.  
 The results of this study are subject to certain limitations.  The results may be 
specific to the business/hobby issue presented in the tax case and may not apply generally 
to all ambiguous tax issues.  Additionally, this study examines the impact of antecedents 
on a tax professional’s final recommendations and does not consider the impact on the 
allowance of aggressive positions, on the willingness to sign the tax return, or on 
information search (Cloyd and Spilker 1999; Bobek et al. 2010; Hansen and White 2012).  
Future research could address these limitations. 
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FIGURE 1 
Theoretical Deterrence and Control Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
                                                         
                                                                                                           
 
           
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Initial focus of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) deterrence activities on individual taxpayers 
to increase taxpayer compliance. 
(2) Recent initiatives push deterrence initiatives down to tax professionals in efforts to increase 
taxpayer compliance through the services of tax professionals.   
(3) These efforts create an implicit control reaction from tax professionals who are put in a 
position of acting in the best interest of the IRS, which is in direct conflict with the 
professional standard of advocacy. 
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FIGURE 2 
Interaction of IRS Oversight and Practice Risk on Final Recommendations 
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FIGURE 3 
Hypothesized Effects of Economic Importance 
H2a and H2b 
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FIGURE 4 
Main Effects of Economic Importance and Client Identification  
on Recommendations 
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TABLE 1 
Practice Risk 
 
 
                         Perceived1 Percent33          
Level/Definition – This Study             Risk       Similar      Level/Definition – Kadous et al. (2008)
     Low   
 
• Have a history of responding timely to requests for information and documentation 
• Usually provide complete records when requested 
• Have no history of prior IRS audit 
• Have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.  
 1.93   64.20%   
    
         Low    • Responds promptly to requests for information or documentation 
• Successfully defended positions during prior audits 
• Has no history of engaging his prior tax practitioner and others in litigation   Moderate   • Have a history of responding slowly or failing to respond to requests for information or documentation 
• Usually provide incomplete records when requested 
• Have been unable to defend tax positions during prior IRS audit 
• Have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.   
 4.94   31.33%      
 High   • Have a history of responding slowly or failing to respond to requests for information or documentation 
• Have been unable to defend tax positions during prior IRS audits 
• Have a history of engaging their prior tax practitioner and others in litigation  
 5.82   6.04%   High   • Responds slowly or fails to respond to requests for information or documentation 
• Has been unable to successfully defend positions during prior audits 
• Has a history of engaging his prior tax practitioner and others in litigation                                                         1 In this study, 144 tax professionals rated the perceived risk level of the low/moderate/high practice risk taxpayer profiles as 
1.93/4.94/5.82 on a scale ranging from lowest (1) to highest (7) risk.  They also noted the percent of similar clients of the 
low/moderate/high practice risk profiles as 64.20 percent/31.33 percent/6.04 percent on a 100 percent scale.  
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TABLE 2 
Ambiguous Decision Scenario ­ Recommendations  
 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation)a 
             Practice Risk 
                          
                                               Lowd               Moderatee             Highf Overall 
  IRS Oversight           Low (General) 
  
 
   High (Imminent)   
Overall  
    
 
         
Panel B: ANOVA Results 
      F         p-valueb  
Model            13.79    <0.001      Experimental Variables     IRS Oversight                       4.08    0.045   Practice Risk          29.80    <0.001 
Interaction     IRS Oversight x Practice Risk        2.50    0.086     
Panel C: Contrast Tests Between Groups – IRS Oversight 
 
    Comparison            t­stat    p­value     ___________________________________________________________________________________________      Low versus high IRS oversight at:        Low Practice Risk (cells 1 versus 4)     .314    .578       Moderate Practice Risk (cells 2 versus 5)   4.48     .039       High Practice Risk (cells 3 versus 6)     5.81    .020  
1  7.21c (2.64) n= 24  
2  5.42 (2.57)       n= 24 
3  2.91 (1.50) n= 23 
  5.21 (2.88) n= 71 4  6.81c (2.42) n= 26 
5  6.96 (2.52) n= 25 
6  4.09 (1.77) n= 22  
  6.04 (2.59) n= 73  7.00 (2.51) n= 50 
 6.20 (2.64) n= 49 
 3.49 (1.73) n= 45  
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Ambiguous Decision Scenario ­ Recommendations  
 
Panel D: Contrast Tests Between Groups – Practice Risk   
    Comparison            t­stat    p­value     ___________________________________________________________________________________________      Low versus moderate practice risk/Low IRS oversight     5.683  .021       (cells 1 versus 2)      Moderate versus high practice risk/Low IRS oversight   16.428  .000       (cells 2 versus 3)      Low versus moderate practice risk/High IRS oversight       .048  .827       (cells 4 versus 5)      Moderate versus high practice risk/High IRS oversight   19.814  .000       (cells 5 versus 6)       a Participants indicated their recommendation using a ten‐point scale numbered from 1 (“Definitely Hobby”) to 10 (“Definitely Business”) b p‐values are based on two‐tailed tests. c These results are consistent with the results in Cloyd and Spilker (1999), interpreting their general client profile as a low practice risk profile. d The low practice risk profile is a new practice risk profile, defined by removing the incidence of prior IRS audit from the definition used in prior research. e The moderate practice risk profile is a new practice risk profile, removing the history of engaging their tax practitioner and others in litigation from the high practice risk profile.   f The high practice risk profile is a replication of the high practice risk profile in Kadous et al. (2008).   
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TABLE 3 
Total Client­Specific Advocacy Scores  
 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation)a 
             Practice Risk 
                          
                                               Low                 Moderate             High Overall 
  IRS Oversight           Low (General) 
  
 
   High (Imminent)   
Overall  
    
 
         
Panel B: ANOVA Results 
      F             p-value  
Model            10.27    <0.001      Experimental Variables     IRS Oversight                       7.80      0.006   Practice Risk          21.22    <0.001 
Interaction     IRS Oversight x Practice Risk        0.14      0.871      a Participants responded to 9 questions (Mason and Levy (2001) Advocacy Scale) using a seven point Likert‐type scale on each question, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  The advocacy scores for each of the nine items were then added together to find the total advocacy score (63 point maximum).        
  43.25 (6.85) n= 24  
 42.46 (7.74)       n= 24 
  33.39 (10.33) n= 23 
  39.79 (9.42) n= 71  45.92 (7.47) n= 26 
 46.58 (7.38) n= 25 
 37.48 (6.37) n= 22  
  43.60 (8.11) n= 73  44.64 (7.23) n= 50 
 44.56 (7.76) n= 49 
 35.39 (8.78) n= 45  
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TABLE 4 
Non­ambiguous Decision Scenario ­ Recommendations  
 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation)a 
             Practice Risk 
                          
                                               Low                 Moderate             High Overall 
  IRS Oversight           Low (General) 
  
 
   High (Imminent)   
Overall  
    
 
         
Panel B: ANOVA Results 
      F         p-valueb  
Model              4.48    0.001      Experimental Variables     IRS Oversight                       1.50    0.222   Practice Risk            7.95    0.001 
Interaction     IRS Oversight x Practice Risk        2.57    0.080      a Participants indicated their recommendation using a one hundred percentage point scale, ranging from 0 percent (no allowable business use deduction) to 100 percent (a fully deductible business use deduction). b  p‐values are based on two‐tailed tests. 
 
 
 97.92 (5.09) n= 24  
 95.00 (8.85)       n= 24 
  89.57 (12.96) n= 23 
  94.23 (9.95) n= 71  91.54 (11.20) n= 26 
 97.20 (6.78) n= 25 
 87.95 (9.59) n= 22  
  92.40 (10.00) n= 73  94.60 (9.30) n= 50 
 96.12 (7.86) n= 49 
 88.78 (11.34) n= 45  
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TABLE 5 
Description of Sample 
(n = 133)  
 
 
Characteristic            Mean      Percent   
 Tax Experience, in months          85.20 (7.10 years) Gender – Percentage of male/female subjects          52.6%/47.4% Employed by national firm                12.1% Employed by regional firm                52.3% Employed by local firm                35.6% Licensed CPA                   84.2% Percentage with advanced degree              48.1% Have the authority to recommend tax positions to clients      68.4% Decision Familiarity*                 86.6%   * Participate in decisions involving business/hobby treatment for current tax clients  
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TABLE 6 
Recommendations  
 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation)a 
             Economic Importance 
                          
                                           Low (<1%)      Moderate (6%)    High (12%)   Overall 
  Client Identification           Low 
  
 
   High   
Overall  
    
 
         
Panel B: ANCOVA Resultsb 
      F         p-valuec  
Model              7.09    <0.001      Experimental Variables     Economic Importance                     6.24    0.003   Client Identification          8.14    0.005 
Interaction     Economic Importance x Client Identification    0.89    0.414     
Panel C: Pairwise Comparisons on Three Level Variables 
 
    Comparison              p­value     ___________________________________________________________________________________________      Economic Importance: 
       Low versus Moderate Economic Importance    0.002       Moderate versus High Economic Importance     0.003       Low versus High Economic Importance    0.984   
1  5.05 (3.01) n= 22  
2  6.57 (1.67)       n= 23 
3  5.90 (2.34) n= 21 
  5.85 (2.44) n= 66 4  6.83 (2.80) n= 24 
5  7.82 (2.10) n= 22 
6  6.10 (1.86) n= 21  
  6.93 (2.38) n= 67  5.98 (3.01) n= 46 
 7.18 (1.98) n= 45 
 6.00 (2.09) n= 42  
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
Recommendations   a Participants indicated their recommendation using a ten‐point scale numbered from 1 (“Definitely Hobby”) to 10 (“Definitely Business”); overall, 35.8 percent indicated hobby treatment and 64.2 percent indicated business treatment. b  Gender and decision familiarity are included in the ANCOVA model because they have been found to have an impact on decision‐making in prior research (McGill 1990; Reckers at al. 1991; Roberts 1998; Hansen and White 2012) and are significant variables in the model.  Although these covariates contribute to the overall power of the model, their inclusion does not substantially alter the main effects of the study (ANOVA model without gender and decision familiarity as covariates, F = 3.371, p = 0.007).  The mean recommendation for males is 7.16 while the mean recommendation for females is 5.54 (t = 3.981, p < 0.001).  This result on gender is consistent with prior research indicating that males are less risk averse than females (McGill 1990; Hansen and White 2012).  The mean for decision familiarity (decision experience) is 3.42 on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 indicating “never” and 7 indicating “frequent” participation, with 86.6 percent of the participants indicating they participate in business/hobby decisions for current tax clients.1  Thus, participants are well suited for the experimental task. c  p‐values are based on two‐tailed tests  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        1 Task specific familiarity has been found to be a significant measure impacting differences in judgment and decision-
making (Reckers et al. 1991; Roberts 1998). 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUMENT - ESSAY TWO 
 
PART A 
 
 
Thank you for your assistance with this study.     By participating in this study, you are helping me complete the requirements of my doctoral program.  In addition, my research is intended to help the professional tax community and, when published, could have a potentially beneficial impact on future policy considerations and on the work of tax professionals.  All individual information and responses will be kept completely confidential.  Your responses are completely anonymous and no identifiers are used to link responses to individual participants.  Please read all directions carefully and answer all questions to the best of your ability.   Please do not discuss the contents of your materials with any other individuals until all materials have been completed and turned in.  If you have questions, please notify one of the administrators of this study.  After you have completed the materials, please turn them in.  If you would like to participate in the raffle, please get a raffle ticket when you turn in your materials.  Once all participants have completed the materials, we will award cash prizes.    Again, thank you for your time and assistance!  Sincerely,     Beth Vermeer, PhD Student, Drexel University AICPA Accounting Doctoral Scholar   Faculty Advisors:  Anthony Curatola, PhD          Bernhard Reichert, PhD     
  125 Treatment 1: Low/General Oversight 
 
Shortly, I will ask you to make two tax reporting decisions for two different clients.  When 
making your decisions for each client, please apply the following information as part of 
each decision.    In 2010, the IRS began implementation of a comprehensive plan to provide better control and oversight of professional tax preparers.  As part of this process, in January 2010, the IRS sent letters to over 10,000 paid tax preparers/offices stating that the IRS plans to visit a number of tax preparers’ offices.    The new IRS initiatives are aimed at directly monitoring and overseeing tax professionals.  If selected for a visit under these initiatives, the IRS requests and reviews numerous client tax files prepared by the selected preparer(s) during a visit to the preparer’s offices.    Doug Shulman, Commissioner of the IRS, stated that the goal of these initiatives is to develop a “comprehensive set of recommendations to help the Internal Revenue Service better leverage the tax return preparer community with the twin goals of increasing taxpayer compliance and ensuring uniform and high ethical standards of conduct for tax preparers” (IRS 2009).    During the initial phase of these new oversight measures, the IRS will continue to work closely with the Department of Justice to pursue civil or criminal action as appropriate.  During 2010, these new IRS initiatives lead to 56 indictments, 25 convictions, and 21 civil injunctions.  (IRS 2010)  In November 2010, as part of the second year initiatives, the IRS again sent letters to over 10,000 paid tax preparers/offices and is planning to visit a portion of the notified preparers/offices during 2011.    You/your firm did not receive a letter from the IRS in either 2010 or 2011 and will not be visited as part of these new initiatives during 2010 or 2011.        
Please answer the following question by circling your answer choice:  1) As part of this study, please circle whether the information above indicates that you or your firm has been selected for a visit from the IRS?      YES      NO     
  126 Treatment 2: High/Imminent Oversight 
 
Shortly, I will ask you to make two tax reporting decisions for two different clients.  When 
making your decisions for each client, please apply the following information as part of 
each decision.    In 2010, the IRS began implementation of a comprehensive plan to provide better control and oversight of professional tax preparers.  As part of this process, in January 2010, the IRS sent letters to over 10,000 paid tax preparers/offices stating that the IRS plans to visit a number of tax preparers’ offices.    The new IRS initiatives are aimed at directly monitoring and overseeing tax professionals.  If selected for a visit under these initiatives, the IRS requests and reviews numerous client tax files prepared by the selected preparer(s) during a visit to the preparer’s offices.    Doug Shulman, Commissioner of the IRS, stated that the goal of these initiatives is to develop a “comprehensive set of recommendations to help the Internal Revenue Service better leverage the tax return preparer community with the twin goals of increasing taxpayer compliance and ensuring uniform and high ethical standards of conduct for tax preparers” (IRS 2009).    During the initial phase of these new oversight measures, the IRS will continue to work closely with the Department of Justice to pursue civil or criminal action as appropriate.  During 2010, these new IRS initiatives lead to 56 indictments, 25 convictions, and 21 civil injunctions.  (IRS 2010)  In November 2010, as part of the second year initiatives, the IRS again sent letters to over 10,000 paid tax preparers/offices and is planning to visit a portion of the notified preparers/offices during 2011.    You/your firm received a letter from the IRS in November 2010 AND your firm has recently been notified that it has been selected for an IRS visit during September 2011.        
 
Please answer the following question by circling your answer choice:  1) As part of this study, please circle whether the information above indicates that you or your firm has been selected for a visit from the IRS?      YES      NO                
  127  All treatments:      
 
 
 
 
 
PART A 
 
 
CLIENT 1                        
  128 
Please read the following information and answer the questions that follow for Client #1.  Treatment 1: Low Risk  John and Joanne Lewis are your tax clients.  They are high‐income taxpayers.  John is the president of a regional restaurant group and Joanne is a computer analyst.  John and Joanne have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding timely to requests for information and documentation, usually provide complete records when requested, have no history of prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.  Treatment 2: High Risk  John and Joanne Lewis are your tax clients.  They are high‐income taxpayers.  John is the president of a regional restaurant group and Joanne is a computer analyst.  John and Joanne have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding slowly or failing to respond to requests for information or documentation, usually provide incomplete records when requested, have been unable to defend tax positions during prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.    Treatment 3: Severe Risk (High Risk definition used in prior research)  John and Joanne Lewis are your tax clients.  They are high‐income taxpayers.  John is the president of a regional restaurant group and Joanne is a computer analyst.  John and Joanne have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding slowly or failing to respond to requests for information or documentation, have been unable to defend tax positions during prior IRS audits, and have a history of engaging their prior tax practitioner and others in litigation.   Given for all Treatments:  Two years ago, Joanne decided to pursue her lifelong dream of becoming a writer.  During the past year, in addition to her job as a computer analyst, she has attended several writing workshops and conferences and has written 35 pages (4 chapters) of her first novel.  Joanne has submitted her novel chapters to multiple publishing agents, but none have been interested in signing her to a contract yet.  She was excited to win a $450 prize for “novel ideas” at a conference she attended in Las Vegas in December.  This is the only income received to date in connection with her writing activities.  John and Joanne want to make Joanne’s writing pursuits a business, which then allows them to deduct $33,000 of expenses related to travel, conference fees, and supplies incurred in connection with Joanne’s writing activities over the past year (Schedule C).  Treasury Regulation §1.183‐2 excerpts are provided in Appendix A to help you in your decision.  You should assume that there are no other applicable tax cases, or regulatory authority, that specifically deal with writing activities and business versus hobby loss rules in making your decisions. 
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After carefully reading the above materials and, if needed, referencing the Treasury 
Regulation excerpts provided in Appendix A, please answer the following questions 
pertaining to Client #1.  Please keep in mind that your office has/has not been selected by 
the IRS to receive a visit.  1) John and Joanne want to treat the writing activities as a business.  Please circle the number, which represents your most likely recommended position?  (i.e., What would you recommend that the taxpayers claim on their tax return?)        Hobby         Business 
|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐| 1   2    3      4       5              6            7             8             9           10     Definitely Hobby                  Definitely Business   2) How strongly do you feel about your recommendation? Please circle the percentage, which best 
reflects your confidence level with your recommendation.    |‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐| 0%    20%    40%    60%    80%    100%   3) John and Joanne want to treat the writing activities as a business.  Please circle the number, which represents your most likely allowed position? (i.e., What would you allow the taxpayers to claim on their tax return?)        Hobby         Business 
|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐| 1   2    3      4       5              6            7             8             9           10     Definitely Hobby                  Definitely Business   4) Please circle the number that best reflects the level of risk you associate with your overall decision.  Please rate the level of risk you associate with the overall decision.                    1                 2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                             Not risky at all                                                               Extremely risky      
  130 5) Please circle the number that best reflects the level of risk you associate with this client.  Please consider the client profile details only (in regard to their cooperation, audit history, litigation history, and overall risk level), prior to and excluding the hobby/business decision.                   1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                             Not risky at all                                                               Extremely risky   6) Please circle the percentage of your current tax clients that are similar (in regard to their cooperation, audit history, litigation history, and overall risk level) to this client?    |‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐| 0%    20%    40%    60%    80%    100%   7) How risk seeking/risk averse do you think this client is?  Please circle your perception of this client’s risk acceptance level.               1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                        Client is risk averse                                                                Client is risk seeking              (not willing to take risks)                                                       (willing to take significant risks)   8) Please circle the number, on each scale, that best reflects the importance of the following issues and the relative impact of each of the following items on your tax reporting decisions:   a) Riskiness of this client profile             1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Not important                                                               Extremely important        b) IRS oversight risks to me or my firm           1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Not important                                                               Extremely important            c) IRS oversight risks to my entire client base           1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Not important                                                               Extremely important        
  131 d) Risk of IRS audit of this client           1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Not important                                                               Extremely important   e) My relationship with this client           1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Not important                                                               Extremely important      
 9) Please circle the number, on each scale, that best reflects your beliefs.    a) In an instance where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue and where the   Code and Regulations are ambiguous, I feel that John and Joanne are entitled to take the   most favorable tax treatment.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                           Strongly agree     b) Generally speaking, my loyalties are first to the tax system, then to John and Joanne.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                    Strongly agree     c) I feel I should apply ambiguous tax law to John and Joanne’s benefit.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                           Strongly agree     d) When examining a tax return, I tend to point out to John and Joanne reasonable positions   they could have taken which would have contributed to minimizing their tax liability.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                           Strongly agree       
  132   e) I believe it is important that I encourage John and Joanne to pay the least amount of taxes   possible.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                      Strongly agree     f) I always interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in favor of John and Joanne.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                     Strongly agree     g) It is important to use trends in the law by trying to establish a pattern of more favorable   treatment for John and Joanne and then extending this pattern to the taxpayer’s position.                 1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                     Strongly agree     h) Where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue, I feel that John and Joanne are   entitled to take the most favorable tax treatment.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                     Strongly agree     i) John and Joanne have the right to structure transactions in ways that yield the best tax   result, even if the law is unclear in an area.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                    Strongly agree       
 
This is the end of Part A! 
 
Please raise your hand so we can collect Part A before you move on to complete Part B. 
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Please read the following information and answer the questions that follow for Client #2.  Treatment 1: Low Risk  Jim and Sue Connor are your tax clients.  They are high‐income taxpayers.  Jim owns a construction company and Sue is a doctor.  Jim and Sue have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding timely to requests for information and documentation, usually provide complete records when requested, have no history of prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.  Treatment 2: High Risk  Jim and Sue Connor are your tax clients.  They are high‐income taxpayers.  Jim owns a construction company and Sue is a doctor.  Jim and Sue have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding slowly or failing to respond to requests for information or documentation, usually provide incomplete records when requested, have been unable to defend tax positions during prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.    Treatment 3: Severe Risk (High Risk definition used in prior research)  Jim and Sue Connor are your tax clients.  They are high‐income taxpayers.  Jim owns a construction company and Sue is a doctor.  Jim and Sue have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding slowly or failing to respond to requests for information or documentation, have been unable to defend tax positions during prior IRS audits, and have a history of engaging their prior tax practitioner and others in litigation.   Given for all Treatments:  Jim Connor owns a construction company and has multiple construction sites within a 60‐mile radius of his construction office, which is attached to his personal residence.  Jim purchased a 2011 Mercedes‐Benz ML550 SUV (hereafter termed SUV) for $58,000 to use full time in his business.  Jim states that he uses the SUV entirely for business purposes, parks the SUV at his home office at the end of each workday, and maintains a second car for personal use.  He has detailed mileage logs substantiating his business use deduction of the SUV.  Based on the information provided, Jim wants to claim 100% business use on the SUV and deduct the maximum allowable expenses on his Schedule C.    An excerpt from IRS Tax Topic 510 is provided in Appendix B to help you in your decision.  You should assume that there are no other applicable tax cases, or regulatory authority, that specifically deal with business use of an automobile in making your decisions.  
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After carefully reading the above materials and, if necessary, referencing Tax Topic 510 
from the IRS website in Appendix B, please answer the following questions pertaining to 
Client #2.  Please keep in mind that your office has/has not been selected by the IRS to 
receive a visit.  1) Jim and Sue want to claim 100% business use of the SUV.  Please circle the business use percentage you would most likely recommend?  (i.e., What percentage would you recommend that the taxpayers claim on their tax return?)        Business Use Percentage Recommended   |‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|                                              0%      10%     20%     30%    40%     50%       60%       70%       80%      90%    100%                   2) How strongly do you feel about your recommendation? Please circle the percentage, which best 
reflects your confidence level with your recommendation.   |‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐| 0%    20%    40%    60%    80%    100%   3) Jim and Sue want to claim 100% business use of the SUV.  Please circle the business use percentage you would most likely allow? (i.e., What percentage would you allow the taxpayers to claim on their tax return?)             Business Use Percentage Allowed   |‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|                                              0%      10%     20%     30%    40%     50%       60%       70%       80%      90%    100%                   4) Please circle the number that best reflects the level of risk you associate with your overall decision.  Please rate the level of risk you associate with the overall decision.                   1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                             Not risky at all                                                               Extremely risky  5) Please circle the number that best reflects the level of risk you associate with this client.  Please consider the client profile details only (in regard to their cooperation, audit history, litigation history, and overall risk level), prior to and excluding the business use of the SUV decision.                    1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                             Not risky at all                                                               Extremely risky 
  136 6) Please circle the percentage of your current tax clients that are similar (in regard to their cooperation, audit history, litigation history, and overall risk level) to this client?    |‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐| 0%    20%    40%    60%    80%    100%   7) How risk seeking/risk averse do you think this client is?  Please circle your perception of this client’s risk acceptance level.               1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                        Client is risk averse                                                                Client is risk seeking              (not willing to take risks)                                                       (willing to take significant risks)  8) Please circle the number, on each scale, that best reflects the importance of the following issues and the relative impact of each of the following items on your tax reporting decisions:   a) Riskiness of this client profile             1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Not important                                                               Extremely important        b) IRS oversight risks to me or my firm           1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Not important                                                               Extremely important            c) IRS oversight risks to my entire client base           1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Not important                                                               Extremely important      d) Risk of IRS audit of this client           1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Not important                                                               Extremely important   e) My relationship with this client           1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Not important                                                               Extremely important  
  137 9) Please circle the number, on each scale, that best reflects your beliefs.    a) In an instance where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue and where the   Code and Regulations are ambiguous, I feel that Jim and Sue are entitled to take the most   favorable tax treatment.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                           Strongly agree     b) Generally speaking, my loyalties are first to the tax system, then to Jim and Sue.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                    Strongly agree     c) I feel I should apply ambiguous tax law to Jim and Sue’s benefit.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                           Strongly agree     d) When examining a tax return, I tend to point out to Jim and Sue reasonable positions they   could have taken which would have contributed to minimizing their tax liability.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                           Strongly agree     e) I believe it is important that I encourage Jim and Sue to pay the least amount of taxes   possible.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                      Strongly agree     f) I always interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in favor of Jim and Sue.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                     Strongly agree     
  138   g) It is important to use trends in the law by trying to establish a pattern of more favorable   treatment for Jim and Sue and then extending this pattern to the taxpayer’s position.                 1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                     Strongly agree     h) Where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue, I feel that Jim and Sue are   entitled to take the most favorable tax treatment.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                     Strongly agree     i) Jim and Sue have the right to structure transactions in ways that yield the best tax result,   even if the law is unclear in an area.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                    Strongly agree       
 
Once you have completed these questions for Client #2, please do not go back and change 
your answers.                      
  139 As mentioned earlier, the new IRS initiatives are aimed at directly monitoring and overseeing tax professionals.  If selected for a visit under these initiatives, the IRS requests and reviews numerous client tax files prepared by the selected preparer(s) during a visit to the preparer’s offices.    Doug Shulman, Commissioner of the IRS, stated that the goal of these initiatives is to develop a “comprehensive set of recommendations to help the Internal Revenue Service better leverage the tax return preparer community with the twin goals of increasing taxpayer compliance and ensuring uniform and high ethical standards of conduct for tax preparers” (IRS 2009).  During 2010, these new oversight initiatives led to approximately 5,000 IRS field visits to tax return preparers, leading to 56 indictments, 25 convictions, and 21 civil injunctions. (IRS 2010)    
Please answer the following questions regarding your thoughts about the new IRS 
initiatives to provide direct monitoring and oversight of tax professionals.   1) Please circle the number that best reflects your belief about the fairness of the IRS office visits as a method to increase monitoring and oversight of tax professionals.          1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                     Completely unfair    Entirely fair   2) Please circle the number that best reflects your perceived increase in risk level (risk of an increase in IRS audits of your clients, preparer penalties, civil/criminal claims) as a result of the IRS’ increased monitoring and oversight of tax professionals.                        1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               No increase                                                               Extreme increase                    in risk level              in risk level               
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Professionals: 
 
Please answer the following demographic questions.  Your answers will help me 
understand your decisions regarding Client #1 and Client #2 and are important. 
 
 1) Please indicate if you are a CPA.    Yes    No  2) Please indicate the number of years of professional public accounting experience you have as a 
tax professional/preparer? _____________years  3) Please indicate your current job position/title? _____________________________________  4) How would you best characterize the type of firm you work in?  Please circle one choice.    Big 4    International    National  Regional  Local    Industry  5) Please circle your highest level of education completed?   Bachelor     Master/MBA     JD/PHD  6) Please circle your current age bracket.       Under 30       31‐35      36‐40     41‐45     46‐50      51‐55      56‐60      61‐65      66‐70    Over 70  7) Please circle your gender.    Female  Male  8) Please circle the number that best reflects your general willingness to take risks.                      1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                        I am not willing         I am willing to take              to take any risks                                                                    a lot of risks  
 
 
You have successfully completed the experiment!  Thank you!! 
 
Please bring your completed materials to the front of the room where you will receive your 
raffle ticket.  We will conduct the raffle shortly! 
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Appendix A – Client #1 
 
Treasury Regulation §1.183­2 excerpts: 
Sec. 1.183‐2  (b) Relevant factors. In determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit, all facts and circumstances with respect to the activity are to be taken into account. No one factor is determinative in making this determination. In addition, it is not intended that only the factors described in this paragraph are to be taken into account in making the determination, or that a determination is to be made on the basis that the number of factors (whether or not listed in this paragraph) indicating a lack of profit objective exceeds the number of factors indicating a profit objective, or vice versa. Among the factors which should normally be taken into account are the following: (1) Manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity. The fact that the taxpayer carries on the activity in a businesslike manner and maintains complete and accurate books and records may indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit. Similarly, where an activity is carried on in a manner substantially similar to other activities of the same nature which are profitable, a profit motive may be indicated. A change of operating methods, adoption of new techniques or abandonment of unprofitable methods in a manner consistent with an intent to improve profitability may also indicate a profit motive. (2) The expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors. Preparation for the activity by extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and scientific practices, or consultation with those who are expert therein, may indicate that the taxpayer has a profit motive where the taxpayer carries on the activity in accordance with such practices. Where a taxpayer has such preparation or procures such expert advice, but does not carry on the activity in accordance with such practices, a lack of intent to derive profit may be indicated unless it appears that the taxpayer is attempting to develop new or superior techniques which may result in profits from the activity. (3) The time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity. The fact that the taxpayer devotes much of his personal time and effort to carrying on an activity, particularly if the activity does not have substantial personal or recreational aspects, may indicate an intention to derive a profit. A taxpayer's withdrawal from another occupation to devote most of his energies to the activity may also be evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit. The fact that the taxpayer devotes a limited amount of time to an activity does not necessarily indicate a lack of profit motive where the taxpayer employs competent and qualified persons to carry on such activity. (4) Expectation that assets used in activity may appreciate in value. The term profit encompasses appreciation in the value of assets, such as land, used in the activity. Thus, the taxpayer may intend to derive a profit from the operation of the activity, and may also intend that, even if no profit from current operations is derived, an overall profit will result when appreciation in the value of land used in the activity is realized since income from the activity together with the appreciation of land will exceed expenses of operation. See, however, paragraph (d) of §1.183–1 for definition of an activity in this connection.   
  142 (5) The success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities. The fact that the taxpayer has engaged in similar activities in the past and converted them from unprofitable to profitable enterprises may indicate that he is engaged in the present activity for profit, even though the activity is presently unprofitable. (6) The taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity. A series of losses during the initial or start‐up stage of an activity may not necessarily be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. However, where losses continue to be sustained beyond the period which customarily is necessary to bring the operation to profitable status such continued losses, if not explainable, as due to customary business risks or reverses, may be indicative that the activity is not being engaged in for profit. If losses are sustained because of unforeseen or fortuitous circumstances which are beyond the control of the taxpayer, such as drought, disease, fire, theft, weather damages, other involuntary conversions, or depressed market conditions, such losses would not be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. A series of years in which net income was realized would of course be strong evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit. (7) The amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned. The amount of profits in relation to the amount of losses incurred, and in relation to the amount of the taxpayer's investment and the value of the assets used in the activity, may provide useful criteria in determining the taxpayer's intent. An occasional small profit from an activity generating large losses, or from an activity in which the taxpayer has made a large investment, would not generally be determinative that the activity is engaged in for profit. However, substantial profit, though only occasional, would generally be indicative that an activity is engaged in for profit, where the investment or losses are comparatively small. Moreover, an opportunity to earn a substantial ultimate profit in a highly speculative venture is ordinarily sufficient to indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit even though losses or only occasional small profits are actually generated. (8) The financial status of the taxpayer. The fact that the taxpayer does not have substantial income or capital from sources other than the activity may indicate that an activity is engaged in for profit. Substantial income from sources other than the activity (particularly if the losses from the activity generate substantial tax benefits) may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit especially if there are personal or recreational elements involved. (9) Elements of personal pleasure or recreation. The presence of personal motives in carrying on of an activity may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit, especially where there are recreational or personal elements involved. On the other hand, a profit motivation may be indicated where an activity lacks any appeal other than profit. It is not, however, necessary that an activity be engaged in with the exclusive intention of deriving a profit or with the intention of maximizing profits. For example, the availability of other investments which would yield a higher return, or which would be more likely to be profitable, is not evidence that an activity is not engaged in for profit. An activity will not be treated as not engaged in for profit merely because the taxpayer has purposes or motivations other than solely to make a profit. Also, the fact that the taxpayer derives personal pleasure from engaging in the activity is not sufficient to cause the activity to be classified as not engaged in for profit if the activity is in fact engaged in for profit as evidenced by other factors whether or not listed in this paragraph.  
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Appendix B – Client #2 
 
 
From http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc510.html: 
 
Topic 510 - Business Use of Car (excerpts) 
 If you use your car in your job or business and you use it only for that purpose, you may deduct its entire cost of operation (subject to limits discussed later). However, if you use the car for both business and personal purposes, you may deduct only the cost of its business use. You can generally figure the amount of your deductible car expense using one of two methods: the standard mileage rate method or the actual expense method. If you qualify to use both methods, before choosing a method, you may want to figure your deduction both ways to see which gives you a larger deduction. Please refer to Publication 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift and Car Expenses, for the current standard mileage rate. If you use the standard mileage rate, you can add to your deduction any parking fees and tolls incurred for business purposes. To use the actual expense method, you must determine what it actually costs to operate the car for the portion of the overall use of the car that is business use. Include gas, oil, repairs, tires, insurance, registration fees, licenses, and depreciation (or lease payments) attributable to the portion of the total miles driven that are business miles. Other car expenses for parking fees and tolls attributable to business use are separately deductible, whether you use the standard mileage rate or actual expenses. The law requires that you substantiate your expenses by adequate records or by sufficient evidence to support your own statement. For further information on record keeping, refer to Topic 305 
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APPENDIX B 
INSTRUMENT - ESSAY THREE 
 
Thank you for your assistance with this study!    This project is helping me complete the requirements of my doctoral program.  In addition, my research is intended to help the professional tax community and, when published, could have a potentially beneficial impact on the work of tax professionals.    The success of this project depends on your use of professional judgment and your thoughtful and complete responses to all questions.  Please read all directions carefully and answer all questions to the best of your ability.   Please do not discuss the contents of your materials with any other individuals until all materials have been completed and turned in.  If you have questions, please notify one of the administrators of this study.  Please know that all of your individual information and responses will be kept completely confidential.  Your responses are completely anonymous and neither individual participants nor your firms will be identified.     Again, thank you for your time and assistance!  Sincerely,     Beth Vermeer, PhD Candidate, Drexel University AICPA Accounting Doctoral Scholar   Faculty Advisor:  Anthony Curatola, PhD                                
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DIRECTIONS 
 
 You will be asked to make a recommendation for a hypothetical tax client and then answer informational questions helpful to our study.  We will provide you with basic client information, details of the tax issue, and applicable Treasury regulations for reference. 
 
 
                               
**PLEASE PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE AFTER READING THE DIRECTIONS** 
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THE CLIENT: JOHN AND JOANNE LEWIS   Treatment 1: Low Economic Bond/Weak Social Identity  John and Joanne Lewis are your tax clients.  John is the president and owner of a successful restaurant group and Joanne is a pharmacist.  John and Joanne have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding timely to requests for information and documentation, usually provide complete records when requested, have no history of prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.    John and Joanne’s total fees, including audit and tax fees for the restaurant group, represent less than one percent (less than 1%) of your firm’s annual revenues.  You receive all your information about these clients through the partner on this engagement and, as such, you do not have personal contact with the taxpayers.  Treatment 2: Medium Economic Bond/Weak Social Identity  John and Joanne Lewis are your tax clients.  John is the president and owner of a successful restaurant group and Joanne is a pharmacist.  John and Joanne have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding timely to requests for information and documentation, usually provide complete records when requested, have no history of prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.    John and Joanne’s total fees, including audit and tax fees for the restaurant group, represent six percent (6%) of your firm’s revenues.  You receive all your information about these clients through the partner on this engagement and, as such, you do not have personal contact with the taxpayers.  Treatment 3: High Economic Bond/Weak Social Identity  John and Joanne Lewis are your tax clients.  John is the president and owner of a successful restaurant group and Joanne is a pharmacist.  John and Joanne have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding timely to requests for information and documentation, usually provide complete records when requested, have no history of prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.    John and Joanne’s total fees, including audit and tax fees for the restaurant group, represent twelve percent (12%) of your firm’s revenues.  You receive all your information about these clients through the partner on this engagement and, as such, you do not have personal contact with the taxpayers.         
  147 Treatment 4: Low Economic Bond/Strong Social Identity  John and Joanne Lewis are your tax clients.  John is the president and owner of a successful restaurant group and Joanne is a pharmacist.  John and Joanne have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding timely to requests for information and documentation, usually provide complete records when requested, have no history of prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.    John and Joanne’s total fees, including audit and tax fees for the restaurant group, represent less than one percent (less than 1%) of your firm’s annual revenues.  Joanne has been your pharmacist for the past seven years and when John and Joanne were selecting a new tax preparer, you brought them in as clients of the firm you currently work for.  As such, you meet individually with the taxpayers each year, serve as their primary point of contact, and you have established a friendly social relationship with John and Joanne.  Treatment 5: Medium Economic Bond/Strong Social Identity  John and Joanne Lewis are your tax clients.  John is the president and owner of a successful restaurant group and Joanne is a pharmacist.  John and Joanne have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding timely to requests for information and documentation, usually provide complete records when requested, have no history of prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.    John and Joanne’s total fees, including audit and tax fees for the restaurant group, represent six percent (6%) of your firm’s annual revenues.  Joanne has been your pharmacist for the past seven years and when John and Joanne were selecting a new tax preparer, you brought them in as clients of the firm you currently work for.  As such, you meet individually with the taxpayers each year, serve as their primary point of contact, and you have established a friendly social relationship with John and Joanne.  Treatment 6: High Economic Bond/Strong Social Identity  John and Joanne Lewis are your tax clients.  John is the president and owner of a successful restaurant group and Joanne is a pharmacist.  John and Joanne have been clients of your firm for three years.  They have a history of responding timely to requests for information and documentation, usually provide complete records when requested, have no history of prior IRS audit, and have no history of engaging their tax practitioner or others in litigation.    John and Joanne’s total fees, including audit and tax fees for the restaurant group, represent twelve percent (12%) of your firm’s annual revenues.  Joanne has been your pharmacist for the past seven years and when John and Joanne were selecting a new tax preparer, you brought them in as clients of the firm you currently work for.  As such, you meet individually with the taxpayers each year, serve as their primary point of contact, and you have established a friendly social relationship with John and Joanne.      
  148 Given for all Treatments:  Joanne studied music in college before deciding to become a pharmacist.  She has continued to play piano and write songs over the years.  Two years ago, Joanne decided to pursue her lifelong dream of becoming a songwriter.  During 2011, in addition to her job as a pharmacist, she attended several music conventions, met with music producers of three record labels, and mailed demo recordings of her songs to various contacts in the music industry.  During 2011, Joanne agreed to allow a potentially promising vocal student to record one of her songs with exclusive rights to the song for 18 months.  To date, she has received a $500 fee for exclusive use of the song, but has not received any royalties for the song.  This is the only income received to date in connection with her songwriting activities.  John and Joanne want to make Joanne’s songwriting pursuits a business, which then allows them to deduct $31,000 of expenses related to travel, recording and production costs, and supplies incurred in connection with Joanne’s songwriting activities over the past year (Schedule C).  Treasury Regulation §1.183‐2 excerpts are provided in Appendix A to help you in your decision.  You should assume that there are no other applicable tax cases, or regulatory authority, that specifically deal with songwriting activities and business versus hobby loss rules in making your decisions. 
 
After carefully reading the above materials and referencing the Treasury Regulation 
excerpts provided in Appendix A, please answer the following questions pertaining to this 
client.    1) John and Joanne want to treat the songwriting activities as a business.  Based on the information provided and the Treasury regulation excerpts in Appendix A, would you recommend hobby or business treatment for Joanne’s songwriting activities?  (Please circle the number that best applies.)            Hobby         Business 
|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐| 1   2    3      4       5              6            7             8             9           10     Definitely Hobby                  Definitely Business   2) Please indicate how confident you are in your recommendation of hobby or business treatment.  (Please circle the percentage that represents your level of confidence.)    |‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐| 0%    20%    40%    60%    80%    100% Not at all                  Completely Confident                   Confident   
  149 3) To what extent would you feel pressure from the client to accept John and Joanne’s preferred business treatment of the songwriting activities?                    1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Very low               Average    Very high   Pressure               Pressure    Pressure   4) To what extent would you feel pressure from your firm to accept John and Joanne’s preferred business treatment of the songwriting activities?                    1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Very low               Average    Very high   Pressure               Pressure    Pressure   5) Would this client represent an economically important client for your firm?           1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                Not economically                    Extremely     important                      economically important   6) Comparing this hypothetical client to your actual tax clients, would you be more likely to feel a strong or weak relationship with this client?              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                Weak relationship            Strong relationship   7) Please circle the percentage of your current individual taxpayer client base that this client represents. (i.e. How similar is this client to your current individual tax clients?)    |‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐| 0%    20%    40%    60%    80%    100% Not similar                        Extremely similar   8) How often have you participated in a decision involving business or hobby treatment for a tax client?                            1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                               Never                        Frequently 
  150 9) Please rate the importance of this type of client to your current firm.                            1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Not at all                                Very                      Important                                                                Important       10) a) When talking about this client, I would say “we” rather than “they”.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree     b) This client’s successes would be my successes.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree     c) When someone praised this client, it would feel like a personal compliment.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree     d) When someone criticized this client, it would feel like a personal insult.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree     e) If a taxing authority questioned this client, it would feel like a personal insult.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree           
       
       
       
       
       
       
  151 11) Please circle the number, on each scale, that best reflects your beliefs.    a) In an instance where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue and where the   Code and Regulations are ambiguous, I feel that John and Joanne are entitled to take the   most favorable tax treatment.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                           Strongly agree     b) Generally speaking, my loyalties are first to the tax system, then to John and Joanne.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                    Strongly agree     c) I feel I should apply ambiguous tax law to John and Joanne’s benefit.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                           Strongly agree     d) When examining a tax return, I tend to point out to John and Joanne reasonable positions   they could have taken which would have contributed to minimizing their tax liability.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                           Strongly agree     e) I believe it is important that I encourage John and Joanne to pay the least amount of taxes   possible.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                      Strongly agree     f) I always interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in favor of John and Joanne.             1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                     Strongly agree      
  152   g) It is important to use trends in the law by trying to establish a pattern of more favorable   treatment for John and Joanne and then extending this pattern to the taxpayer’s position.                 1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                     Strongly agree     h) Where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue, I feel that John and Joanne are   entitled to take the most favorable tax treatment.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                     Strongly agree     i) John and Joanne have the right to structure transactions in ways that yield the best tax   result, even if the law is unclear in an area.              1                2                  3                4                  5                  6                 7                Strongly disagree                                                                    Strongly agree   12) Please answer the following questions about the CPA profession by circling the number on each scale that represents your response:  a) When someone criticizes my profession, it feels like a personal insult.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree     b) When I talk about my profession, I usually say “we” rather than “they”.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree     c) I am very interested in what others think about my profession.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree       
       
       
       
  153 d) My profession’s successes are my successes.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree     e) When someone praises my profession, it feels like a personal compliment.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree   13) Please answer the following questions about your firm by circling the number on each scale that represents your response:  a) When I talk about my firm, I usually say “we” rather than “they”.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree     b) My firm’s successes are my successes.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree     c) I am very interested in what others think about my firm.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree     d) When someone criticizes my firm, it feels like a personal insult.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                      Strongly disagree                     Strongly agree    e) When someone praises my firm, it feels like a personal compliment.                              1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very        Strongly disagree                            Strongly agree 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
  154 14) Do you feel that you are likely to make a different tax recommendation to a client you know and like versus a client that you don’t know or don’t like?      Yes         No  15) Would you be likely to make the same decision, a more aggressive decision, or a less aggressive decision for a client you know and like versus a client that you don’t know or don’t like?            1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                                  Less Aggressive                Same                                      More Aggressive                               Decision                                         Decision                                         Decision        16) Would you be likely to make the same decision, a more aggressive decision, or a less aggressive decision for a client when facing higher IRS scrutiny?            1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                                 Less Aggressive                Same                                     More Aggressive                             Decision                                           Decision                                         Decision      
  17) Would you be likely to make the same decision, a more aggressive decision, or a less aggressive decision for a client you consider to be “low risk” versus a client you consider to be “high risk”?            1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                                 Less Aggressive                Same                                     More Aggressive                             Decision                                           Decision                                         Decision       18) Which of the following best describes how you conduct research to reach a tax recommendation for a client?  (Circle one answer.) a) Verify basic support for the most client favorable tax position and research the finer details later if the tax position is ever questioned b) Use as much time as needed to research the tax issue, examining the pros and cons of each potential tax position for the client c) Determine the amount of time that I can allot to the research and then conduct research that first supports the preferred tax position and, if there’s time, research the pros and cons of each tax position for the client  d) Think about the tax position that best benefits the client and conduct research to support that position  
  155 19) If you are given a limited amount of time to research a potential tax position for a client, how would you conduct your research efforts?  Please circle the number that best reflects your research strategy                            1                  2                  3                  4                  5                                                          Not at all                                                          Very                  Conduct research                    Conduct research                  to support most                    to examine the pros and                  favorable client position,                            cons of each potential tax                  given time constraints                                 position, regardless of time constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
Please answer the following demographic questions.  Your answers are important. 
 
 1) Please indicate if you are a CPA.    Yes    No  2) Please indicate the number of months of professional public accounting experience you have as 
a tax professional/preparer. _____________months  3) How would you best characterize the type of firm you work in?  Please circle one choice.    Big 4    International    National  Regional  Local    Industry  4) Please indicate the number of months you have been employed with your current   firm. ____________________months  5) Please circle your highest level of education completed:   Bachelor     Master/MBA     JD/PHD  6) Please circle your current age bracket.       Under 30       31‐35      36‐40     41‐45     46‐50      51‐55      56‐60      61‐65      66‐70    Over 70  7) Please circle your gender.    Female  Male   
 
 
You have successfully completed the experiment!  Thank you!! 
 
Please bring your completed materials to the front of the room where you will receive your 
raffle ticket.  We will conduct the raffle shortly! 
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Appendix A – Business/Hobby Decision 
 
Treasury Regulation §1.183­2 excerpts: 
Sec. 1.183‐2  (b) Relevant factors. In determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit, all facts and circumstances with respect to the activity are to be taken into account. No one factor is determinative in making this determination. In addition, it is not intended that only the factors described in this paragraph are to be taken into account in making the determination, or that a determination is to be made on the basis that the number of factors (whether or not listed in this paragraph) indicating a lack of profit objective exceeds the number of factors indicating a profit objective, or vice versa. Among the factors which should normally be taken into account are the following: (1) Manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity. The fact that the taxpayer carries on the activity in a businesslike manner and maintains complete and accurate books and records may indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit. Similarly, where an activity is carried on in a manner substantially similar to other activities of the same nature which are profitable, a profit motive may be indicated. A change of operating methods, adoption of new techniques or abandonment of unprofitable methods in a manner consistent with an intent to improve profitability may also indicate a profit motive. (2) The expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors. Preparation for the activity by extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and scientific practices, or consultation with those who are expert therein, may indicate that the taxpayer has a profit motive where the taxpayer carries on the activity in accordance with such practices. Where a taxpayer has such preparation or procures such expert advice, but does not carry on the activity in accordance with such practices, a lack of intent to derive profit may be indicated unless it appears that the taxpayer is attempting to develop new or superior techniques which may result in profits from the activity. (3) The time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity. The fact that the taxpayer devotes much of his personal time and effort to carrying on an activity, particularly if the activity does not have substantial personal or recreational aspects, may indicate an intention to derive a profit. A taxpayer's withdrawal from another occupation to devote most of his energies to the activity may also be evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit. The fact that the taxpayer devotes a limited amount of time to an activity does not necessarily indicate a lack of profit motive where the taxpayer employs competent and qualified persons to carry on such activity. (4) Expectation that assets used in activity may appreciate in value. The term profit encompasses appreciation in the value of assets, such as land, used in the activity. Thus, the taxpayer may intend to derive a profit from the operation of the activity, and may also intend that, even if no profit from current operations is derived, an overall profit will result when appreciation in the value of land used in the activity is realized since income from the activity together with the appreciation of land will exceed expenses of operation. See, however, paragraph (d) of §1.183–1 for definition of an activity in this connection.    
  157 (5) The success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities. The fact that the taxpayer has engaged in similar activities in the past and converted them from unprofitable to profitable enterprises may indicate that he is engaged in the present activity for profit, even though the activity is presently unprofitable. (6) The taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity. A series of losses during the initial or start‐up stage of an activity may not necessarily be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. However, where losses continue to be sustained beyond the period which customarily is necessary to bring the operation to profitable status such continued losses, if not explainable, as due to customary business risks or reverses, may be indicative that the activity is not being engaged in for profit. If losses are sustained because of unforeseen or fortuitous circumstances which are beyond the control of the taxpayer, such as drought, disease, fire, theft, weather damages, other involuntary conversions, or depressed market conditions, such losses would not be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. A series of years in which net income was realized would of course be strong evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit. (7) The amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned. The amount of profits in relation to the amount of losses incurred, and in relation to the amount of the taxpayer's investment and the value of the assets used in the activity, may provide useful criteria in determining the taxpayer's intent. An occasional small profit from an activity generating large losses, or from an activity in which the taxpayer has made a large investment, would not generally be determinative that the activity is engaged in for profit. However, substantial profit, though only occasional, would generally be indicative that an activity is engaged in for profit, where the investment or losses are comparatively small. Moreover, an opportunity to earn a substantial ultimate profit in a highly speculative venture is ordinarily sufficient to indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit even though losses or only occasional small profits are actually generated. (8) The financial status of the taxpayer. The fact that the taxpayer does not have substantial income or capital from sources other than the activity may indicate that an activity is engaged in for profit. Substantial income from sources other than the activity (particularly if the losses from the activity generate substantial tax benefits) may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit especially if there are personal or recreational elements involved. (9) Elements of personal pleasure or recreation. The presence of personal motives in carrying on of an activity may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit, especially where there are recreational or personal elements involved. On the other hand, a profit motivation may be indicated where an activity lacks any appeal other than profit. It is not, however, necessary that an activity be engaged in with the exclusive intention of deriving a profit or with the intention of maximizing profits. For example, the availability of other investments which would yield a higher return, or which would be more likely to be profitable, is not evidence that an activity is not engaged in for profit. An activity will not be treated as not engaged in for profit merely because the taxpayer has purposes or motivations other than solely to make a profit. Also, the fact that the taxpayer derives personal pleasure from engaging in the activity is not sufficient to cause the activity to be classified as not engaged in for profit if the activity is in fact engaged in for profit as evidenced by other factors whether or not listed in this paragraph.     
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Post­Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions once you have completed the previous materials.  
Please do not go back and change your answers above. 
 
 For questions 1‐4: Please circle the number, on each scale, that best reflects your beliefs.  1) How important was the following in your recommendation decision for the case study you just completed:  Your risk of economic loss from penalties and litigation?         1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                                    Not                                             Extremely   Important      Important  2) How important was the following in your recommendation decision for the case study you just completed:  Your risk of loss of your professional reputation?          1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                                    Not                                             Extremely   Important      Important  3) How important was the following in your recommendation decision for the case study you just completed:  Maintaining the client relationship?          1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                 7                                    Not                                             Extremely   Important      Important   4) What is your assessed likelihood that business treatment of the tax issue (in the case study you just completed) would be sustained on its merits?    |‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐|‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐| 0%    20%    40%    60%    80%    100% Not likely at all                Extremely likely to be sustained                to be sustained      
  159 5) Do you currently have the authority to recommend tax positions to tax clients? (Please circle yes or no.)         Yes    No   6) In current tax practice, what is the tax return preparer penalty currently in place under IRC Section 6694 for unreasonable (undisclosed) positions that result in underpayment of the tax liability?  Please circle the best answer.   a) $250   b) $500   c) The greater of $1000 or 50 percent of the income derived by the tax return preparer   7) In current tax practice, what is the tax return preparer standard currently in place under IRC Section 6694 for unreasonable (undisclosed) positions that result in underpayment of the tax liability?  Please circle the best answer.   a) Realistic Possibility Standard (i.e., a 1 in 3 chance or better that the tax position will be   sustained on its merits)   b) Substantial Authority Standard (i.e., approximately 40 percent chance or better that the   tax position will be sustained on its merits)   c) More Likely Than Not Standard (i.e., a greater than 50 percent chance that the tax   position will be sustained on its merits)   
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